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MISUNDERSTANDING MODELS IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC  
HEALTH REGULATION 
WENDY WAGNER, ELIZABETH FISHER,** AND PASKY PASCUAL*** 
ABSTRACT 
Computational models are fundamental to environmental 
regulation, yet their capabilities tend to be misunderstood by 
policymakers.  Rather than rely on models to illuminate dynamic 
and uncertain relationships in natural settings, policymakers too 
often use models as “answer machines.”  This fundamental 
misperception that models can generate decisive facts leads to a 
perverse negative feedback loop that begins with policymaking 
itself and radiates into the science of modeling and into regulatory 
deliberations where participants can exploit the misunderstanding 
in strategic ways.  This paper documents the pervasive 
misperception of models as truth machines in U.S. regulation and 
the multi-layered problems that result from this misunderstanding.  
The paper concludes with a series of proposals for making better 
use of models in environmental policy analysis. 
INTRODUCTION 
Computational models are largely invisible to most lawyers 
and policymakers, but they form the foundation for critical 
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regulatory programs and exert a powerful, albeit unacknowledged 
impact on regulatory outcomes.  The Washington Post and The 
New Yorker featured articles highlighting the critical role of 
models in addressing environmental problems such as water 
quality in the Chesapeake Bay1 and global warming.2  Recent 
books targeting a general readership document and ultimately 
criticize policymakers’ over-reliance on environmental models to 
generate answers.3  Outside the realm of environmental regulation, 
the ubiquity and shortcomings of computational models are also 
gaining notoriety: within a two-month time span, the New York 
Times Magazine and Wired Magazine devoted lengthy articles 
tracing the economic crisis of 2008 back to the deliberate misuse 
of arcane financial models.4 
Computational models are tools that provide a simplified, 
quantitative view of a small slice of the world, but existing legal 
doctrine and regulatory programs are developed in ways that tend 
to conceive of these models as providing extravagant and largely 
accurate representations of reality.5  Models—concocted by 
mathematicians and scientists—are expected to magically generate 
answers to urgent environmental questions, often with five 
significant digits and remarkable precision.  Indeed, we learn of 
super computers that make modeling still more accurate and 
speedy, allowing mathematicians to turn out even more elaborate 
models, graphics, and three-dimensional projections for 
policymakers to use as the basis for regulation. 
Yet, despite their extraordinary influence on environmental 
policy, models are often created, refined, and deployed in the 
backroom, behind the curtain, only to be hauled out for critical 
attention when things go very wrong.  And in these moments when 
policy and legal analysts do encounter the basic realities of 
modeling, they find themselves in for a surprise.  Much like the 
 
 1 Peter Whoriskey, Bay Pollution Progress Overstated, WASH. POST, July 
18, 2004, at A1. 
 2 Elizabeth Kolbert, The Climate of Man–II, NEW YORKER, May 2, 2005, at 
64, 64. 
 3 See, e.g., ORRIN H. PILKEY & LINDA PILKEY-JARVIS, USELESS 
ARITHMETIC: WHY ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENTISTS CAN’T PREDICT THE FUTURE 
(2007). 
 4 Felix Salmon, Recipe for Disaster: The Formula that Killed Wall Street, 
WIRED, Feb. 23, 2009, at 74, 74; Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 4, 2009, § 6 (Magazine), at 24. 
 5 See infra Part II.A. 
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Wizard of Oz, when the actual mechanisms that make these 
models work are exposed, onlookers discover that, much like their 
human creators, computational models are fragile and contestable.6  
These inherent qualities may ultimately cause some decision-
makers to reject models outright once it becomes clear that the 
models are not decisive.  Of course, the fact that models are 
incomplete and uncertain does not mean that they lack value for 
policy analysis; indeed precisely the opposite.  It simply means 
that models are not “truth machines”7 but instead offer other assets 
to policymaking, such as providing a conceptual map of existing 
relationships, highlighting new interconnections, and elucidating 
important uncertainties, all of which significantly aid policy 
deliberation, but do not replace it.8 
In most settings, however, policymakers are neither interested 
in nor able to peek behind the curtain, contenting themselves 
instead with the misperception of models as “answer machines.”  
In environmental regulation, in fact, this wrong-headed conception 
of models appears not only to be pervasive, but deeply engrained 
in the regulatory programs themselves.  As a result, confusion and 
even anxiety abounds within the regulatory sphere regarding the 
appropriate use and methods for assessing the reliability of models.  
When the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) model for 
predicting health effects for families living near industrial or other 
major sources of toxic contamination was questioned as 
inadequately cautious, for example, the public uproar caused a loss 
of confidence in the agency and in existing regulatory protections.9  
Top journalists now dedicate book-length treatments to recording 
the travails and conflicts within both scientific and policymaking 
communities regarding the reliability of climate change models.10  
 
 6 See infra Part I.C. 
 7 This term is borrowed from a similar reference to models as “answer 
machines” in John Leslie King & Kenneth L. Kraemer, Models, Facts, and the 
Policy Process: The Political Ecology of Estimated Truth 7 (Ctr. for Research on 
Info. Sys. & Org., Univ. of Cal., Irvine, Working Paper No. URB-006), available 
at http://www.crito.uci.edu/research-archives/pdf/urb-006.pdf. 
 8 COMM. ON RISK CHARACTERIZATION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
UNDERSTANDING RISK 100 (1996) (observing how “[m]odels provide a 
framework that defines the relationships that are valuable to study and specify 
how measured quantities are to be interpreted in relation to the real world”). 
 9 See Mark Obmascik, EPA Home-Toxins Test ‘Crude and Limited’; Widely 
Used Computer Model Often Wrong, DENVER POST, Jan. 7, 2002, at A1. 
 10 See, e.g., CHRIS MOONEY, STORM WORLD: HURRICANES, POLITICS, AND 
THE BATTLE OVER GLOBAL WARMING (2007). 
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Even outside of the U.S., environmental models bump through the 
judicial and administrative system in zig-zag fashion.  An agency’s 
model may be vigorously challenged, only to be affirmed by a 
lower court and ultimately reversed by the highest court.11 
This paper discusses this core misunderstanding of models 
within environmental policy and regulation and tallies some of the 
damage it is doing to the regulatory state.  In the already fragile 
terrain of science and law, a strong and consistent 
misunderstanding of models creates significant chain reactions not 
only in policy circles, but rippling out to adversely affect the 
science of modeling and providing opportunities for new types of 
strategic regulatory games. 
The argument that models are often misunderstood as “truth 
machines” in environmental policymaking is developed in three 
parts.  The first part outlines the fundamental role that models play 
in most areas of environmental regulation and then examines the 
interior workings of models, including their basic assumptions and 
data sets.  The second part identifies the ways that models are 
nevertheless viewed as truth machines within administrative and 
environmental law.  After exploring the damage that this 
misunderstanding does to policymaking, the paper traces the ripple 
effects of the misunderstanding out to modeling science and to 
strategic games occurring in high stakes regulatory disputes.  The 
final section explores ways that these interrelated problems might 
be addressed.  Obviously the simplest solution is to correct the 
core misunderstanding that generates all the trouble.  For well-
established regulatory programs, however, this is not so easy.  This 
final section grapples with practical realities and suggests a series 
of different adjustments that should lead to a more realistic 
appreciation of the value of models and increase their value to 
policymaking. 
 
 11 Consider, for example, the judicial flip-flop in the review of a risk 
assessment concerning the health effects of crop spraying in Britain.  Downs v. 
Sec’y of State for Env’t, Food & Rural Affairs [2008] EWHC (QB) 2666, rev’d 
[2009] EWCA (Civ) 664 (U.K.).  A striking feature of these two decisions is that 
the judges took very different approaches, a fact suggesting that the judiciary has 
developed no clear approach for dealing with models.  Another example of lower 
and upper courts taking very different approaches to reviewing a risk assessment 
model can be seen in the Australian case of Australian Pork Ltd. v. Director of 
Animal Plant Quarantine (2005) 216 A.L.R. 549, rev’d (2005) 146 F.C.R. 368. 
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I. THE TRUTH ABOUT MODELS 
The aphorism that “all models are wrong, but some are 
useful” captures the central truth about models.12  Models are 
needed to synthesize raw data, often from multiple sources, into 
computational forms that provide a more comprehensive picture 
about an ecosystem or environmental scenario under different 
conditions.13  Without models, we have only data and theories that 
are largely disconnected from one another.  Indeed, if we were to 
abandon the use of computational models in environmental policy, 
regulation would be set back to pre-1970 levels and most 
regulatory programs would come to a grinding halt. Yet at the 
same time, computational models are incomplete and provide only 
a partial, and often very imperfect representation of reality. 
In this section, we take a tour inside computational models.  
This tour first highlights the basic characteristics of models (at 
least those under examination in this paper) and the rapidly 
growing use of models in environmental policy.  The second 
subsection then peels back the sleek outputs of models to look at 
the interior data sets and algorithms.  The third and fourth sections 
analyze the role that models play in environmental regulation.  
This discussion lays the foundation for the remainder of the article 
by establishing what models really are, before considering how 
they are misunderstood. 
A. Models in Environmental Regulation 
Scientists never have perfect data.  Even if they did, models 
would still be vital tools to organize all of the data, make sense of 
it, and predict the future.  Models help policymakers understand 
how the world works by taking information, assumptions, 
knowledge, and theories and translating them into a statement 
about critical interactions that in turn can be used to make 
decisions.14  More specifically, models help structure how 
 
 12 GEORGE E. P. BOX & NORMAN R. DRAPER, EMPIRICAL MODEL-BUILDING 
AND RESPONSE SURFACES 424 (1987). 
 13 See, e.g., COMM. ON MODELS IN THE REGULATORY DECISION PROCESS, 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MODELS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY 
DECISION MAKING 31 (2007) [hereinafter NRC] (defining a model as “a 
simplification of reality that is constructed to gain insights into select attributes 
of a particular physical, biological, economic, or social system.  Models can be 
of many different forms.”). 
 14 See, e.g., Naomi Oreskes, Why Believe a Computer? Models, Measures, 
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regulatory decision-makers can proceed from uncertain 
information to a hypothetical view of the physical world to a 
rational, regulatory decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although models are comprised of a wide array of synthesis 
tools, some of which are nonmathematical,15 in this paper we focus 
only on models that provide mathematical representations of a 
system since it is these mathematical, esoteric qualities that create 
most of the problems for policy.16  In these models, an analyst will 
select elements from a system and formalize relationships among 
these elements through mathematical equations that are codified 
within an algorithm, usually with the help of a computer program.  
For purposes of this paper, we use the term “model” to refer to a 
formal hypothesis about how the elements of a system are 
mathematically related, which will typically include multiple 
sources of data and algorithms.17 
While they are central in economic policy, social policy, and a 
wide range of other areas of regulatory activity, models are 
perhaps of greatest importance to environmental and health 
regulation.  In this setting, models are often used to provide the 
factual representation of the system at issue.  In particular, they 
provide a characterization of issues of consequence in regulatory 
decision-making.  Thus, models provide a means of assessing, 
measuring, and/or predicting exposure or harm.  Model outputs 
 
and Meaning in the Natural World, in THE EARTH AROUND US: MAINTAINING A 
LIVABLE PLANET 70, 70–82 (Jill S. Schneiderman ed., 2000) (discussing these 
attributes of models). 
 15 See, e.g., NRC, supra note 13, at 32 (describing nonmathematical models, 
like physical models). 
 16 A system—whether it be the U.S. economy, the ecology of the Rhine 
River, or the European Commission’s political system—is a set of phenomena 
that shares some common aspect(s) in which one is interested. 
 17 See NRC, supra note 13, at 31–32 (describing computational models used 
for environmental regulation in similar terms). 
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can trigger heightened (or reduced) regulatory requirements under 
virtually all environmental regulatory programs.18  Models also 
determine “how clean is clean” and establish remedial targets that 
can cost well into the billions of dollars.19  Models inform how 
much manmade stress an ecosystem can endure without losing 
significant species diversity.20  In short, models are not only 
“useful,” but have become invaluable to virtually all facets of 
environmental decision-making. 
This can be seen by analyzing the use of models by the EPA 
in its effort to satisfy its Clean Air Act (CAA) mandate to ensure 
that all areas of the United States do not exceed ambient standards 
for several major air pollutants.21  Since the regulatory system 
demands that all areas in the United States fall below these 
pollutants levels in order to protect the public health with “an 
adequate margin of safety,” models quickly became an integral 
part of the regulatory process.22  EPA uses risk assessment models 
to determine the “safe” level of air pollution for sensitive 
subgroups in the population,23 and it deploys models to predict 
how these pollutants disperse through the atmosphere after they 
have been emitted from various mobile and stationary sources.24  
 
 18 See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006) (requiring states to 
meet national ambient air quality standards); Clean Water Act § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 
1313(c)(2)(A) (2006) (requiring states to meet water quality standards); see also 
NRC, supra note 13, at 47–48 (describing EPA modeling activities in greater 
detail). 
 19 See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Cleanup, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA) § 121(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b) (providing for cleanup of 
contaminated sites using risk assessment); cf. JAMES T. HAMILTON & W. KIP 
VISCUSI, CALCULATING RISKS? THE SPATIAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF 
HAZARDOUS WASTE POLICY 212 (1999) (criticizing the Superfund program for 
dedicating excessive cleanup monies to minimal risks). 
 20 See generally Robert L. Glicksman, Bridging Data Gaps through 
Modeling and Evaluation of Surrogates: Use of the Best Available Science to 
Protect Biological Diversity Under the National Forest Management Act, 83 
IND. L.J. 465 (2008) (describing in detail the models used by the Forest Service 
for this purpose). 
 21 See Clean Air Act §§ 109–110, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409–7410 (2006). 
 22 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2006). 
 23 See, e.g., OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS, EPA, 
REVIEW OF NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR OZONE: 
ASSESSMENT OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION 73–103 (1996) 
(modeling the expected risk to children playing outdoors during heavy ozone 
concentrations in trying to determine risks to susceptible subgroups). 
 24 James D. Fine & Dave Owen, Technocracy and Democracy: Conflicts 
Between Models and Participation in Environmental Law and Planning, 56 
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Since states generally implement CAA programs in their own 
jurisdictions under federal direction, states also have incentives to 
develop and run very precise models that will both predict and 
explain how the state will attain ambient standards presently and in  
the future.25  States can lose valuable federal highway funds, for 
example, if they cannot establish—with models—that their air 
quality will meet the national standards by the requisite deadline.26  
Models—indeed, very elaborate models—have thus become a vital 
feature of this central Clean Air Act program. 
Congress and federal agencies use computational models in a 
wide variety of other policy and regulatory settings as well.27  See 
Table 1.  For example, EPA and the states use models extensively 
in the Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) program of the Clean 
Water Act,28 the CAA’s residual risk program (for air toxics),29 
risk assessments for the cleanup of Superfund sites and defunct 
hazardous waste facilities,30 and in setting drinking water standards 
under the Safe Drinking Water Act.31  EPA uses quantitative risk 
assessment models to evaluate the safety of pesticides and toxic 
chemicals under its licensing programs.32  Public land management 
 
HASTINGS L.J. 901, 912–16 (2005) (discussing this modeling effort). 
 25 See generally North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(challenging EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule because it will insufficiently 
protect downwind states from pollution from upwind states). 
 26 See, e.g., Abramowitz v. EPA, 832 F.2d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(holding that Southern California’s failure to attain ambient air quality threshold 
must be redressed by EPA, even if changes were dramatic); JAMES E. 
MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HIGHWAY FUND SANCTIONS FOR CLEAN 
AIR ACT VIOLATIONS 2 (1997) (“[S]tates are free to choose their own approach, 
provided that their plan demonstrates sufficient reductions in emissions to 
demonstrate compliance, using approved EPA air quality models.”). 
 27 NRC, supra note 13, at 47–48. 
 28 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2006); OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
TMDL PROGRAM 58–59, 63 (2d ed. 2002). 
 29 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2006). 
 30 See generally National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 
Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (2009) (regulations governing cleanup at 
Superfund sites). 
 31 See, e.g., Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(4)(A) (2006) 
(maximum drinking water contaminants “set at the level at which no known or 
anticipated adverse effects on the health of persons occur and which allows an 
adequate margin of safety”). 
 32 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), Registration 
of Pesticides, 7 U.S.C. § 136a (2006); Data Requirements for Pesticides, 40 
C.F.R. § 158.34 (2009) (quantitative risk studies required for new pesticide 
registrations). 
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agencies also use models extensively:33 “By one account, an 
inventory of simulation models available in 1993 for forest 
planning and ecosystem management identified 250 different 
software tools.”34  Models are even used by the EPA in the 
enforcement context to set penalties at levels that ensure adequate 
deterrence.35  Finally, models are used outside of rulemakings in 
ways that nevertheless exert a significant impact on regulatory 
goals and requirements.  Plaintiffs bringing toxic tort suits often 
rest their causation case in large part on computational models, for 
example.36  Models are also used by agencies or Congress in 
assessing problems, setting priorities, or evaluating the efficiency 
of rules.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33 See, e.g., Glicksman, supra note 20, at 476–77 (discussing uses of models 
by land management agencies to predict impacts of oil and hazardous waste 
spills on natural lands and wildlife, to designate critical habitat, and to weigh 
risks of proposed land uses). 
 34 Id. at 490. 
 35 See, e.g., NRC, supra note 13, at 60–61 (discussing these models used to 
determine appropriate penalty amounts). 
 36 See, e.g., Matthew W. Swinehart, Note, Remedying Daubert’s Inadequacy 
in Evaluating the Admissibility of Scientific Models Used in Environmental-Tort 
Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1281, 1284–88 (2008) (providing an overview of the 
value of quantitative models in environmental litigation settings). 
 37 See NRC, supra note 13, at 56–66 (describing various uses of models with 
examples of how Congress uses the environmental models). 
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The use of climate change models by the federal government 
provides the most obvious contemporary example of the important 
role that models can play in developing policy.38  For example, to 
regulate carbon dioxide (CO2) as a greenhouse gas under the Clean 
Air Act, EPA must first issue a finding that CO2 endangers public 
health and welfare.39 EPA drew heavily from the Fourth 
 
 38 For EPA’s current activities with respect to climate change, many of which 
use or depend on models, see EPA’s climate change home page, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/index.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2010). 
 39 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–35 (2007); see Clean Air Act § 
202, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006) (emission standards for new motor vehicles). 
 
WAGNER.MACRO.FORAUTHORS.FINAL.DOC 5/12/2010  2:05:31 PM 
2010] MISUNDERSTANDING MODELS 303 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) to reach the conclusion that most of the observed 
global warming in recent centuries can be attributed to the 
anthropogenic rise in greenhouse gases, including CO2 and that as 
a result these gases endanger public health and welfare.40 In turn, 
the IPCC report was based on evidence provided by multiple 
models describing the effect of greenhouse gases on atmospheric, 
oceanic, and land surface processes.41  Entire chapters in the report 
were devoted to studies evaluating the models that served as the 
basis for the IPPC’s conclusions. 
The IPCC report highlights important themes that represent an 
extreme case of environmental models, but can nevertheless 
inform how other models should be treated.42  First, the climate 
models simulate conditions that occur at spatial and temporal 
scales that do not lend themselves easily to observation.  Second, 
these models simulate complex processes that are intricately 
interconnected.  Although the model results must be treated with a 
cautious awareness of their limitations, the IPCC report also 
highlights the fact that formal evaluation techniques can be used to 
determine whether a model’s ultimate conclusions are consistent 
with the evidence.  For example, the results from climate models 
can be evaluated against historical and current climactic 
conditions.  Additionally, the results of multiple climate models 
can be evaluated to determine consistencies in model results. 
Even after issuing its finding on endangerment, EPA’s task—
and its continued reliance on models—is far from over.  After 
reaching its decision regarding the environmental effects of CO2 
and climate change, a decision based largely on the results of 
physical models, EPA must now develop and evaluate economic 
models to value the net costs or benefits of these effects.43 
 
 40 Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse 
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886, 18,894–
904 (Apr. 24, 2009). 
 41 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 112–18 (2007). 
 42 Id. 
 43 See generally William Funk, Political Checks on the Administrative 
Process, in AM. BAR ASS’N, A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF 
FEDERAL AGENCIES 211, 218–28 (John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005) 
(summarizing the process of regulatory review by the Office of Management and 
Budget, which requires federal agencies to conduct cost-benefit analyses for 
major regulatory proposals). 
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Climate change models are only one example of the many 
types and uses of models for environmental regulation that indicate 
that the agencies’ dependence on models over the last decade 
appears to be on a sharp incline.  EPA has developed an office to 
provide oversight for models (the Council for Regulatory 
Environmental Modeling), added a models database to its website, 
and commissioned a National Research Council (NRC) report to 
help it assess models in the future.44  Even some congressmen have 
become intimately involved in trying to understand the intricacies 
of models.45 
To understand why models influence environmental 
policymaking and why their influence will likely increase in the 
future, one can look to the co-evolution of risk assessment and 
modeling.  In 1983, an influential NRC report formalized the 
paradigm that has long guided the government’s evaluation of 
chemical risks.46  The report recognized that, faced with scientific 
complexity and uncertainty, regulatory agencies needed to make 
simplifying assumptions to fulfill their statutory mandates to 
protect human health, as reflected in the following words, taken 
from the report’s working papers: 
Regulation—and the rule of law more generally—demands 
simplification . . . . The assessment of a public health risk is 
inherently complex, and ambiguities and probabilities abound 
. . . .  Results that are conclusive enough to satisfy a scientist’s 
professional standard of proof are rare.  If public health risks 
are to be regulated at all, many assumptions—deliberate 
choices in the face of scientific uncertainty—must be made in 
order to satisfy a regulator’s need for simplified answers . . . .47 
 
 44 See EPA Council for Regulatory Environmental Modeling (CREM), 
http://www.epa.gov/CREM (last visited Mar. 10, 2010); EPA CREM Models 
Knowledge Base, http://www.epa.gov/CREM/knowbase (last visited Mar. 10, 
2010) (searchable database of computational models that are developed, used, or 
supported by EPA’s offices); NRC, supra note 13, at 2. 
 45 See, e.g., THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING 
SCIENCE: HOW SPECIAL INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 275–78 
(2008) (describing Congressman Joe Barton’s communications with climate 
change modelers). 
 46 COMM. ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUB. 
HEALTH, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT (1983). 
 47 Lawrence E. McCray, An Anatomy of Scientific and Extra-Scientific 
Components in the Assessment of Scientific Data on Cancer Risks, in COMM. ON 
THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUB. HEALTH, NAT’L 
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For example, the 1983 report acknowledged that human data were 
rarely available to evaluate a chemical’s influence on cancer. 
Instead, agencies could rely on data from “a well conducted rat 
study”48 and then use simplifying assumptions to extrapolate the 
rat dose-response model to potential effects on humans. 
Today, laboratory techniques can now measure chemical 
concentrations and physiological responses at various scales of 
human biological organization—from genes to cells to tissues to 
organs to the entire body. At the same time, newer statistical 
techniques provide researchers with more systematic and holistic 
ways to analyze the data across these scales.  As one might expect, 
the combination of more data and better analytical tools has led to 
demands for more sophisticated modeling.  In 2007, a NRC report 
articulated a vision of toxicity testing that moved beyond animal 
testing to models that assimilated human data and that provided a 
more complete description of the mechanisms underlying the 
human response to toxic chemicals.49  While the report recognized 
that scientific uncertainties continue to plague the risk assessment 
process, it also prescribed using more formal methods to 
quantitatively analyze a model’s uncertainties.  The call for better 
models, accompanied by better information about a model’s 
limitations, was echoed in 2009 by yet another NRC report, which 
highlighted the need for formal analyses of model uncertainties.50 
As an indication of a regulatory agency’s inevitable use of 
models, the White House’s Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB), which approves the cost-benefit analysis accompanying 
every major regulation, issued a circular requiring all executive 
agencies to conduct their analyses with more transparency by 
using formal model evaluation techniques.51  By issuing the 
 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: 
WORKING PAPERS 83, 84 (1983). 
 48 William M. Stigliani, The Consumer Safety Commission’s Risk Assessment 
for Formaldehyde, in COMM. ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF 
RISKS TO PUB. HEALTH, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: WORKING PAPERS 4, 17 (1983). 
 49 COMM. ON TOXICITY TESTING & ASSESSMENT OF ENVTL. AGENTS, NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOXICITY TESTING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2007). 
 50 COMM. ON IMPROVING RISK ANALYSIS APPROACHES USED BY THE EPA, 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND DECISIONS: ADVANCING RISK 
ASSESSMENT 93–126 (2009). 
 51 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4 ON REGULATORY ANALYSIS 
2–3 (2003). 
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circular, OMB recognized that most regulations depend on models 
and wanted to encourage agencies to be more forthcoming about 
their models’ assumptions and limitations. 
B. Categorizing Models 
Despite their prevalent use in regulation, policymakers’ and 
lawyers’ understanding and engagement with models are quite 
limited; as a result, models remain a mystery to those most 
involved in their application and use in policy.  Much of this 
mystery derives from models’ technical nature (which will be 
discussed in the next section), but also from the sheer variety of 
models. Models are not homogenous in nature: they vary in 
purpose, scale, size, and in technical content.  Some are relatively 
simple, dealing with discrete issues;52 others model complex 
ecosystems.53  Models may be developed to be stand-alone54 or to 
operate as part of a larger analytical process, such as a risk 
assessment.55  Models may be supported by regulatory offices, or 
they may be the product of ongoing inter-institutional 
cooperation.56  Models are developed by both the public and 
private sector, but in the field of environmental modeling the 
federal government has been the primary supporter of the 
development, utilization, and oversight of models used for 
regulation. 
We offer several methods of categorizing models to further 
highlight variations in their intrinsic qualities.  A first distinction 
between models lies in the difference between mechanistic and 
statistical models (although most models are usually a 
combination of the two).  A mechanistic model attempts to 
simulate the mechanisms—the physical pathways—through which 
a natural system operates.  For example, fairly sophisticated 
 
 52 See, e.g., NRC, supra note 13, at 38 (describing simple, one-dimensional 
flow and transport equations used to model leaking underground storage tanks). 
 53 See, e.g., Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment, 63 Fed. Reg. 26845, 
26864–91 (May 14, 1998). 
 54 See, e.g., EPA, Better Assessment Science Integrating Point and Non-point 
Sources (BASINS model), http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/BASINS (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2010) (geographic information system (GIS) watershed-based 
model and national dataset for analyzing water quality). 
 55 See, e.g., PHYSIOLOGICALLY BASED PHARMACOKINETIC MODELING 10–12 
(Micaela B. Reddy et al. eds., 2005) (describing a type of biology-based 
modeling that typically fits within a larger risk assessment). 
 56 See EPA Models Knowledge Base, supra note 44. 
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models will simulate the physical process through which particles 
of the metal chromium will leach through the soil and into the 
groundwater by taking into account physical and chemical 
attributes of each component in the system.  A statistical model 
uses data to draw inferences about the natural system based on 
associations and correlations among the data.  For example, a 
researcher might take measurements of chromium in the soil and in 
the groundwater and run a statistical analysis to develop a 
mathematical function relating the two.  This distinction between 
mechanistic and statistical affects the inferences that can be drawn 
from the models.  A mechanistic model based on physical 
constants that remain unchanged over time can, in theory, be used 
to make long-term predictions.  On the other hand, statistical 
models assume related events conform to underlying probability 
relationships that may change over time.  Therefore, long-term 
predictions based on these probability relationships should be 
made with this limitation in mind. 
Second, with respect to their use, there are physical and 
economic models.  The former type models the physical 
components of an environmental system; the latter type models 
how society values an environmental resource.  For example, a 
physical model might describe how mercury disperses through the 
atmosphere and the ecosystem after being emitted from coal-
burning electric utilities, while an economic model would predict 
the value that the nation places on avoiding the harmful effect of 
mercury on children’s cognitive abilities.  The distinction between 
physical and economic models influences the assumptions one can 
make during model development.  For example, physical models 
typically assume that the underlying events of a physical system 
conform to probabilistic assumptions.  However, the economic 
value that society attaches to environmental resources must often 
be estimated from human behavior and choices, which may not 
necessarily conform to probabilities that are stable over time. 
Finally, one can sub-categorize physical models according to 
the stage of the life-cycle they seek to simulate.  For example, 
source models might account for how many electric utilities across 
the U.S. burn coal and what the mercury content of their coal is in 
order to estimate how much mercury is emitted.  An exposure 
pathway model might then simulate how mercury travels through 
the atmosphere; how much of the mercury ends up in surface 
waters; and how much of it is then converted to methylmercury, 
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which makes the mercury available to organisms.  A receptor 
model might then simulate how much of the methylmercury ends 
up in fish or in human beings.  Finally, an impact model might 
then simulate how mercury might ultimately affect the cognitive 
abilities of a child whose mother has consumed fish contaminated 
by mercury. 
Most of the models listed in Table 1—whether used to fulfill 
EPA’s mandate to protect the nation’s air or water quality or to 
regulate the flow of hazardous waste or toxic chemicals through 
commerce—are typically a combination of economic and physical 
models developed through a combination of mechanistic and 
statistical approaches.  The physical models typically focus on a 
portion or on several portions of the process through which a 
pollutant proceeds from source to receptor and manifests itself in 
some adverse impact on the receptor. 
C. Examining the Interior Limits of Models 
Models play a central role in policymaking that is both 
irreplaceable and is growing more valuable over time.  As we 
stated above, models assist regulatory decision-makers in making 
the most rational and reasonable decisions they can on the basis of 
uncertain information.  Yet models also have limitations, and these 
limitations are substantial.  In this section, we draw back the 
curtain to reveal some of the more significant limitations of 
models. 
While the “troubled marriage between science and law” is 
now a familiar phenomenon,57 models may best be thought of as 
the unhappy couple’s inconsolable child.  All of the challenges that 
afflict science used for policy also afflict models: significant 
uncertainties and subjective judgments loom in model design, in 
interpretation of the data, and in communicating that data to other 
scientists as well as lay persons.58  Even more significant are the 
considerable judgments necessary to interpret and extrapolate a 
discrete research study to a larger policy problem (and the related 
 
 57 Oliver Houck, Tales from a Troubled Marriage: Science and Law in 
Environmental Policy, 302 SCI. 1926, 1926 (2003) (discussing areas of conflict 
and providing cautionary tales about introducing more “sound science” into 
environmental regulation). 
 58 See MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 45, 64–76 (describing how 
research sponsors with a private interest in the outcome use these pressure points 
to “shape the science” to fit their needs). 
WAGNER.MACRO.FORAUTHORS.FINAL.DOC 5/12/2010  2:05:31 PM 
2010] MISUNDERSTANDING MODELS 309 
temptation to misrepresent those judgments as primarily 
scientific).  But models present even more complications for 
policymaking, in large part because they are so much more closely 
intertwined with policy-based assumptions than most of this 
applied and basic research.59 
First and most important, models are developed in response to 
problems or questions; in most regulatory settings models do not 
exist without this prelude or invitation.  Yet the question that 
frames the model limits its “domain” or applicability, in some 
cases dramatically.60  This question—the purpose of the model—
determines what type of data is relevant, establishes which 
assumptions are most important, and sets both the scope and the 
scale of the model in terms of how much detail is needed and even 
basic trade-offs between, for example, accuracy at a small scale 
and accuracy at a larger scale.61  Indeed, the funding and 
marketability of commercial and academic models arises in large 
part because these models fill a niche in policy-relevant analysis.  
Thus, unlike models used in basic research, which push out from 
existing theory by testing it against new or unique questions, 
regulatory models tend to be developed with a policy need in 
mind.  For example, a statutory requirement or a court-ordered 
deadline might compel EPA to assess the risks associated with 
potentially hazardous waste from coal combustion.  To meet these 
directives, EPA may develop a risk assessment model based on 
available data, rather than embark on a new effort to collect more 
comprehensive and complete data.  Or else EPA may focus only 
on the risk posed by a handful of highly toxic chemicals arising 
from coal combustion and limit its analysis accordingly.  Either 
way, the documentation that accompanies a regulatory model 
should contain enough information about the underlying data, 
assumptions, and analytical approaches to allow an interested and 
objective stakeholder to assess the domain of the model. 
Second, and also unlike a basic research study that collects 
 
 59 In general terms, applied science is research that promises direct impacts 
on the economy and jobs, and which is likely to enjoy more funding and political 
support than basic or pure science.  Martin Carrier, Knowledge and Control: On 
the Bearing of Epistemic Values in Applied Science, in SCIENCE, VALUES, AND 
OBJECTIVITY 275, 275–76 (Peter Machamer & Gereon Wolters eds., 2004). 
 60 See NRC, supra note 13, at 93–95 (describing the importance of 
specifying the model context, including identifying the domain). 
 61 Id. at 89, 93–95. 
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data in order to test a hypothesis, a model seeks to answer a 
question using whatever data and theories are on hand.62  As such, 
modeling is not an inflexible formula yielding strict results but 
something far more opportunistic.  Modeling involves synthesizing 
disparate data, assumptions, uncertainties, and theories in the most 
robust way possible.63  This, in turn, involves several different 
steps, each of which involves considerable judgment and thus 
introduces additional sources of uncertainty and variation between 
models. 
The process of assembling a model is explained using Figure 
2, which we have presented linearly for simplicity’s sake.64  As a 
first step, the modeler must decide the elements of a system on 
which to focus—this is sometimes determined quite clearly by the 
question put to the modeler.  In most cases, even with a very 
specific question, there is still substantial room for judgment in 
determining what components should be left in a model and what 
should be left out.  For example, to model a river’s water quality, 
the modeler, as an initial matter, must decide which among many 
factors—oxygen concentration, river flow, and depth—actually 
drive the system.  In the second step, the modeler collects data 
about the system, a process beset with uncertainties about whether 
she has chosen and properly applied the correct methods to gather 
representative data in characterizing the system.  For example, in 
modeling the river, how should oxygen be measured, from which 
locations should measurements be taken, and how often?  If the 
data that would ideally resolve the question are not available, then 
are the available data adequate or robust enough for use?  Third, 
the modeler must then infer some mathematical description of the 
system from the data.  For example, decreases in oxygen 
concentration might be observed to follow increases in nitrogenous 
run off, which may lead to fish kills. Because uncertainties 
permeate the modeler’s understanding of the system, however, 
drawing these inferences is often extremely difficult.65 
 
 62 See, e.g., JO SMITH & PETE SMITH, INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
MODELING at ch. 2 (2007). 
 63 See NRC, supra note 13, at 21, 25 (describing these advantages of models 
for decision-making). 
 64 For a detailed description of factors relevant to design in the case of Clean 
Air Act models, see Fine & Owen, supra note 24, at 922–30. 
 65 See, e.g., Kenneth H. Reckhow & S. C. Chapra, Modeling Excessive 
Nutrient Loading in the Environment, 100 ENVTL. POLLUTION 197, 206 (1999) 
(discussing problems in water quality modeling, many of which stem from 
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The final source of uncertainty arises after a model has been 
created and involves its continual evaluation.  Many models have 
no benchmark or yardstick against which they can be easily 
evaluated or compared.  Oreskes et al., for example, take modelers 
to task when they represent that they are “verifying” or 
“validating” models instead of conceding that these determinist 
measures simply cannot be made for models.66  Unlike basic 
 
inadequate data, and concluding that “it should not be surprising that 
theoretically based improvements in a model often cannot be supported with the 
limited available observational data”).  The biggest problem in this regard is 
drawing robust inferences from uncertain evidence.  Natural systems are subject 
to random variability, and, as such,  the modeler must somehow discern “signals” 
within the data—information about the general principles that define a system’s 
essence—as distinguished from irrelevant, extraneous, or misleading “noise.”  
To do so, the modeler must often view the world in probabilistic terms.  For 
example, if nitrogen (and its consequences) did not affect fish mortality, then all 
things being equal, the modeler might assume that the pattern of fish kills over 
time might approximate a normal distribution or “bell curve,” a pattern that 
indicates random variability and that is independent of nitrogen concentrations. 
 66 See Naomi Oreskes et al., Verification, Validation, and Confirmation of 
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research, which can at least be replicated to ascertain whether the 
data is reliable and the interpretation of the data is sound, models 
consist of an amalgam of theories and datasets that can be 
compared to other model-amalgams without coherent criteria for 
making the comparison.  It is thus difficult to compare the results 
of different models that purport to simulate the same 
environmental system.  Regulatory decisions are intended to apply 
prospectively and the purpose of a regulatory model is to use 
information about the past to approximate a system so that 
predictions can be made about the system’s future.  Therefore, 
simply comparing model results to historical data is insufficient to 
evaluate the overall performance of a model. 
Consider the system being modeled in Figure 2.  Based on the 
data, the model being proposed is that the relationship between 
maternal exposure to mercury and the child’s IQ is downwardly 
linear.  But even given the same data and the same mathematical 
function (i.e., a straight line), two different models might still 
characterize this relationship very differently.  To evaluate these 
two models, one would need to know more about the different 
assumptions and analytical techniques that underlie each. 
To summarize, evaluating a model’s soundness requires more 
than just comparing model outputs to other models or to historical 
data.  It also requires information about the assumptions and 
analytical techniques through which a model was developed.  
When this information is not provided, then the model runs the risk 
of being too closely tethered to its creator and unavailable to 
public scrutiny.  Having said that, the modeling community has yet 
to establish a coherent, universally-shared set of guiding principles 
through which regulators and interested stakeholders can evaluate 
whether one model (or set of models) can be said to be more 
appropriate for a given situation than another.  Because these 
principles are often unavailable (see infra Part II.B.), judging the 
veracity of competing models can be quite difficult, even for the 
expert modeler.  In the words of the statistician Richard Royall, 
evaluating scientific evidence is in a “theoretical and conceptual 
mess . . . . With no accepted principles to guide statistical 
reasoning, we can offer . . . nothing more than conflicting expert 
 
Numerical Models in the Earth Sciences, 263 SCI. 641, 644 (2004) (arguing that 
“the burden is on the modeler to demonstrate the degree of correspondence 
between the model and the material world it seeks to represent and to delineate 
the limits of that correspondence”). 
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judgments about what is sensible.”67 
D. Contextualizing Models Used in Regulation 
As shown above, models are contingent on a number of 
judgments that are not just scientific.  This final section takes an 
additional step back to view the broader role that legal and 
regulatory culture play in affecting how models are understood and 
integrated into policy.  This broader perspective also highlights the 
uniquely technocratic features of U.S. regulation that may present 
a worst case scenario with regard to misunderstanding models.  
There are at least three features of regulatory culture that have 
some bearing on how models are developed and understood in 
policy circles. 
First, since models are developed for regulation, the 
prevailing regulatory culture will intimately influence how they are 
designed and deployed.  At a basic level, regulatory objectives will 
frame the purpose and role of a model.  If a regulatory goal is 
“good ecological status,” for example, then that is what a model 
will seek to measure.  But that is not the end of the influence of the 
regulatory framework—regulatory culture will also have a role to 
play in how detailed a model has to be and how it provides its 
outputs.  Models are thus not hermeneutically sealed off from the 
rest of regulatory practice, but closely related to it. 
For example, in 2007 the Supreme Court ruled that the Clean 
Air Act authorized EPA to regulate carbon dioxide, and that EPA 
needed to issue a finding on whether the pollutant endangered 
human health and welfare.68  Leading up to the ruling, much was 
made of the uncertainties in the climate change models, with trade 
associations69 and university researchers70 arguing opposite 
 
 67 Richard Royall, The Likelihood Paradigm for Statistical Evidence, in THE 
NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 119, 145–46 (Mark L. Taper & Subhash R. 
Lele eds., 2004). 
 68 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–35 (2007). 
 69 See, e.g., Brief For Respondents Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers et 
al. at 44–47, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120) (arguing 
that the Bush administration EPA correctly refused to regulate CO2 in light of 
scientific uncertainty concerning the causal relationship between greenhouse gas 
emissions and climate change, citing the National Research Council’s 2001 
Climate Change Science report). 
 70 Compare Brief for Climate Scientists David Batista et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 9–10, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 
05-1120) (arguing that the NRC Climate Change Science report “unambiguously 
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interpretations of the same National Research Council report on 
climate change.71  Two years after the Supreme Court issued its 
ruling, EPA issued its proposed finding of endangerment, basing 
its finding on the scientific assessments and models documented 
by several science institutions: the International Panel on Climate 
Change, the U.S. Climate Change Science Program, and the 
National Research Council.72  In the technical document 
accompanying its finding, EPA took pains to explain the scientific 
basis for its decision, detailing both the provenance of the 
scientific evidence (e.g., the peer review process, the underlying 
data and models used), as well as the dominant sources of 
uncertainties.73  Regulatory demands, political conflicts, and 
modeling science were inextricably intertwined in influencing 
EPA’s final modeling product. 
Second, the overarching regulatory context lays out the 
blueprint for establishing which decisions will be recognized as 
authoritative.  The role models will play within this blueprint is 
thus inextricably bound to this larger cultural understanding.74  In 
some regulatory cultures, like the U.S., for example, there tends to 
be an overriding expectation that a decision-maker should follow a 
model if a model is deemed legitimate.75  In this culture, regulators 
are expected to do more than simply consult models; they are 
ultimately expected to seek out or develop models to provide 
answers to regulatory problems. 
 
concluded that Earth’s climate is changing” and “found strong evidence” for 
anthropogenic causation justifying EPA regulation of greenhouse gas emissions), 
with Brief for Climatologist Sallie Baliunas et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 5–8, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120) 
(arguing that the Climate Change Science report “unequivocally states our lack 
of comprehensive knowledge of the overall effects of human induced climate 
change”). 
 71 COMM. ON THE SCI. OF CLIMATE CHANGE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY QUESTIONS (2001). 
 72 Proposed Endangerment Findings for Greenhouse Gases, supra note 40, at 
18,894. 
 73 CLIMATE CHANGE DIV., EPA, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT FOR 
ENDANGERMENT AND CAUSE OR CONTRIBUTE FINDINGS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES 
UNDER SECTION 202(A) OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 3–7 (2009). 
 74 On worthiness and legitimacy, see JÜRGEN HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION 
AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 178–79 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon 
Press 1979). 
 75 See NRC, supra note 13, at 18 (explaining that EPA relies on model 
outputs to “inform and set priorities in environmental policy development and 
implementation”). 
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The third aspect of regulatory context worthy of note affects 
whether and when a model is considered legitimate.  Of course 
model legitimacy is not a neutral issue but instead is inherently 
normative and varies depending on the understanding of good 
public administration that operates in a regulatory culture at any 
one time.  Thus, while models may be a constant feature of the 
regulatory landscape, what we understand their role and nature to 
be can vary dramatically, and lawyers and policymakers are 
constantly framing how models are understood, even if they do not 
do so consciously. 
In the U.S., for example, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum 
Institute (the “Benzene” case),76 Judge Leventhal’s interpretation 
of hard look review,77 and the NRC’s seminal 1983 study on risk 
assessment by federal agencies (known as the “Red Book”)78 all 
tended to equate model legitimacy with an ability of the model to 
provide regulators with an answer.  The plurality in Benzene was 
concerned that the Occupational Safety and Health Act gave 
OSHA “unbridled discretion”79 and the court thus introduced the 
requirement that OSHA first establish there was a “significant 
risk”—determined essentially with the help of a computational 
model—before regulating.80  Likewise, in requiring that regulatory 
decision-makers establish the “reasonableness and reliability”81 of 
their methodology, Judge Leventhal sought to ensure that agency 
technical decisions were made on prediction not prophecy:82  The 
processes inherent in administrative decision-making and judicial 
review, such as cross-examination, should be “engines for truth.”83  
 
 76 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (holding that OSHA is not permitted to impose a 
“lowest technologically feasible” standard for exposure to a carcinogen absent 
proof of significant risk of harm to workers under the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act). 
 77 Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68–69 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J., 
concurring) (arguing for “hard look” review in which courts inquire into agency 
decisions whenever there is “some factual support” for a challenger’s contention 
that the agency acted unreasonably). 
 78 NRC, COMM’N ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF 
RISKS TO PUBLIC HEALTH, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: 
MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983). 
 79 448 U.S. at 614. 
 80 Id. at 645. 
 81 Int’l Harvester v. Ruckelhaus, 478 F.2d 615, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 82 Id. at 642. 
 83 Id. at 631. 
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Each of these legal and policy developments advanced a particular 
vision of public administration that portrayed legitimate models in 
a technocratic light. 
It is thus important to remember that model legitimacy and 
the larger role of models within regulation will vary significantly 
with differing understandings of good administration.  In his 
dissent in Benzene, in fact, Justice Marshall exemplified a 
different, minority view in describing the plurality’s decision as 
“extraordinarily unfair” because “its characterization of the 
Secretary’s report bears practically no resemblance to what the 
Secretary actually did in this case.”84  Likewise Chief Judge 
Bazelon, in promoting a very different concept of hard look review 
than that promoted by Judge Leventhal, understood that while 
“scientists seek to conquer uncertainty, regulators needed to act in 
spite of it.”85  In so doing, regulators needed to be transparent, 
flexible, and deliberative, while acting on the basis of judgment 
calls.86  In thinking about the role of models, then, one should not 
underestimate the power of the surrounding regulatory culture in 
how models are understood.  Indeed and as discussed next, 
characterizations of models are often based less on what models 
are and more on assumptions about what an environmental 
regulator expects them to be. 
II. MISUNDERSTANDING MODELS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
Computational models are highly contingent mathematical 
approximations of what reality might be like, yet in policy and 
legal circles they are often viewed as tools that are capable of 
providing precise, definitive answers to pressing policy questions.  
This basic misunderstanding leads the legal analyst down one of 
two equally treacherous paths.  In some and likely most cases the 
analyst will tend to place too much confidence in the model, 
viewing it as empirically determinative, and thus will fail to 
evaluate or qualify it in a rigorous way.  In other cases, the 
policymaker will inquire further into the workings of the model 
 
 84 448 U.S. at 695 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 85 David Bazelon, Science and Uncertainty: A Jurist’s View, 5 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 209, 213 (1981). 
 86 See, e.g., id. at 212, 214; AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 651 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979); Natural Res. Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 547 
F.2d 633, 637–56 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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and become disillusioned with the uncertainties and multiple 
sources for judgment and reject it in total.  In both cases, models 
are misused and their true contributions—about relationships, 
dynamic qualities, and even uncertainties in the system—are 
passed over. 
This part traces the core misunderstanding of models as “truth 
machines” in U.S. regulation.  The first section documents the 
prevalence of this misunderstanding throughout a great deal of 
environmental law and litigation, and identifies how the resultant 
misunderstanding causes significant harm to environmental 
policymaking.  The second and third sections then trace out the 
chain reaction this misunderstanding creates in the science of 
modeling and in high stakes regulatory disputes.  See Figure 3. 
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A. The Core Misunderstanding: Models as “Truth Machines” 
Models are embedded in and shaped by their institutional 
context, but from the perspective of the courts, many policymakers 
in Congress, and even the agencies, there is a widespread (though 
not uniform)87 misconception that models provide deterministic 
answers.88  Under this view, an environmental model is perceived 
as a value-neutral description of reality and any residual 
uncertainty is viewed as a defect, rather than an ineluctable 
attribute of the scientific endeavor.  Specifically, models are used 
to prove that there is a relationship between source and effect, 
rather than exploring the nature and contours of this possible 
relationship, along with other variables, in dynamic ways. 
1. The Perception of Models as “Truth Machines” in U.S. 
Regulation 
An unrealistic expectation that models will provide “answers” 
for policy rather than more qualified and dynamic information 
pervades nearly all of the major environmental programs.  The 
Clean Water Act expects modelers to isolate the precise point at 
which reductions in the pollutant load for a river will enable it to 
attain water quality standards.89  Once the modeler provides this 
“answer,” policymakers then return and determine how to allocate 
the appropriate shares of pollutant reduction.90  The Clean Air Act 
 
 87 Decision-makers do not always err in their evaluation or use of models.  
There are circumstances where the agencies or the courts do an excellent job 
understanding the contributions and limitations of models.  See, e.g., NRC, supra 
note 13, at 176–77 (commending EPA’s use of multiple models to assess 
uncertainties in estimating mercury bioaccumulation in fish).  In this section we 
catalog the most common and most preventable errors. 
 88 This argument is developed further in HOLLY DOREMUS & WENDY 
WAGNER, THE COURTS AND SCIENCE (forthcoming 2010); see also Daniel 
Sarewitz, How Science Makes Environmental Controversies Worse, 7 ENVTL. 
SCI. & POL’Y 385, 386 (2004) (observing the “pervasive and strongly held 
notion” in policy circles that science is “a source of verifiable facts and theories 
about reality”); Fine & Owen, supra note 24, at 909–10 (observing that 
“Congress assumed [in many environmental statutes] that science would drive 
decision-making and that agencies could interpret scientific information to set 
the right policies”). 
 89 See Houck, supra note 57, at 1928 (lamenting these fundamental problems 
in the design of the TMDL and Clean Air Act programs). 
 90 Clean Water Act § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2006) (requiring states 
to establish maximum daily effluent limitations necessary to meet waterway 
standards). 
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balances enormously expensive and protracted regulatory 
requirements on the outputs of air quality models and then uses 
those models to determine what steps must be taken—steps that 
can dramatically alter the region’s economy—to meet that 
“output.”91  There is no middle ground in the model’s use: it either 
generates this single answer or it does not.  Additional variables, 
uncertainties, or other qualifiers highlighted by the model are 
considered an unwelcome distraction in these regulatory exercises. 
In health risk assessments, the demand for a single number or 
output from a model is also quite common.92  EPA has been 
berated repeatedly for its bad habit of using point estimates from 
risk assessments and otherwise representing model outputs as 
decisive, single numbers without error bars.93  As the NRC warned 
in its condemnation of the practice, EPA’s use of point estimates 
“suppresses information about sources of error that result from 
choices of model, data sets, and techniques for estimating values of 
parameters from data.”94 
Evidence of this “truth machine” conception of models in the 
U.S. regulatory system is perhaps easiest to trace through court 
opinions, where judges have the opportunity to look at models in 
specific contextual settings. Since courts appear to exert 
 
 91 See supra notes 21–26 and accompanying text. 
 92 Although policymakers may deploy computer models to provide 
“answers” for policy, the responsibility for this misunderstanding in the capacity 
of models may rest with scientists as well.  See, e.g., Peter W. Preuss & Paul D. 
White, The Changing Role of Risk Assessment in Federal Regulation, in RISK 
QUANTITATION AND REGULATORY POLICY 331, 335 (David G. Hoel et al. eds., 
1985) (noting that federal agencies have moved from simple, imprecise linear 
models of risk to “complicated model-fitting computer programs” and that “[t]he 
statistical techniques in these calculations are sophisticated and can be so 
involved that risk assessors themselves do not fully understand the details”); see 
also infra Part II.B. 
 93 See, e.g., NRC, supra note 13, at 7 (“Effective decision making will 
require providing policy makers with more than a single probability distribution 
for a model result . . . .”); RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 
supra note 46, at 7–8 (1983) (recommending that agencies prepare “written risk 
assessments that explicitly state the basis of choice among inference options”). 
 94 NRC, COMM. ON RISK ASSESSMENT OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS, 
SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT 184 (1994). The NRC also 
suggests that instead EPA should “make uncertainties explicit and present them 
as accurately and fully as is feasible.”  Id. at 185.  But see Preuss & White, supra 
note 92, at 340–42 (scientists expressing concern that point estimates mislead 
decision-makers, while EPA scientist, Dr. Roy Albert, argues that the scientist’s 
job is to “take a position” regarding the risk and “if it isn’t that position [i.e., 
point estimate], then it’s got to be another one”). 
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particularly strong influences on agency behavior, their opinions 
play an important role in the agency’s use (or misuse) of models.95  
In resolving challenges to models, most courts perpetuate the 
pervasive misunderstanding and assume that since the model is 
mathematical, it is correct.  As a result, they pass the model 
through the system without much, if any, scrutiny.  The dominant 
trend in the courts follows this deferential, deterministic path, even 
in cases when there are reasons to suspect that the model may have 
significant problems.96 
In analyzing the courts’ review of the universe of EPA’s 
models, for example, one of us found that by far the most common 
approach taken by the courts was nearly complete deference to 
models.97  As one court noted: 
As long as an agency reveals the data and assumptions upon 
which a computer model is based, allows and considers public 
comment on the use or results of the model, and ensures that 
the ultimate decision rests with the agency, not the computer 
model, then the agency use of a computer model to assist in 
decision making is not arbitrary and capricious.98 
 
 95 The courts exert pressure on agencies when judges delve into the 
procedure and (less frequently) the substance of agency decision-making.  They 
also indirectly become a tool of pressure insofar as litigation imposes substantial 
delays on agency action and drives up costs of proposed projects.  See ROBERT 
A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 224–25 (2001) (explaining that courts 
provide a “vehicle for substantial delay” by opponents who have only to file a 
lawsuit to set a burdensome process rolling); R. Shep Melnick, Administrative 
Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 245, 247–49 (1992) 
(observing that courts have imposed vague substantive standards, and that 
decisions often appear arbitrary, putting agencies on the defensive and changing 
their rulemaking strategies). 
 96 See Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial 
Decisionmaking, Statutory Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in 
Environmental Law, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 767, 817–19 (2008) (concluding based 
on sample that courts “are well aware of their limitations in addressing issues of 
scientific expertise” and that the Circuits “have built upon the Supreme Court’s 
statements in both Chevron and Baltimore Gas [& Electric Co. v. NRDC] to 
create strong principles of deference when environmental science is involved”). 
 97 Thomas O. McGarity & Wendy E. Wagner, Legal Aspects of the 
Regulatory Use of Environmental Modeling, 10 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,751, 10,757 
(2003) (observing the considerable deference that courts generally afford EPA 
models, despite extensive nitpicking by stakeholders). 
 98 Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Serv., 878 F. Supp. 1295, 1310 (D.S.D. 1993), 
aff’d 46 F.3d 835 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Nat’l Oilseed Processors Ass’n v. 
Browner, 924 F. Supp. 1193, 1217 (D.D.C. 1996) (after noting the extensive 
effort EPA dedicated to identifying appropriate candidates for listing on the 
national Toxic Release Inventory list, the district court concluded that, although 
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Some courts, particularly in the earlier years of regulation, do 
not even insist on a full explanation of the assumptions or basis for 
the model itself.99  Instead these courts conclude that “it is not for 
the judicial branch to undertake comparative evaluations of 
conflicting scientific evidence.”100 
In his analysis of judicial review of forest planning models, 
Professor Glicksman similarly found that the “courts were . . . very 
deferential to the manner in which the Forest Service used the 
FORPLAN model.”101  Glicksman was able to locate only one 
reported case where a Forest Service model was struck down, 
despite a number of credible attacks in other cases that on their 
face warranted closer examination.102  For example, in rejecting an 
attack on a travel zone model that the Forest Service used to 
project travel patterns in a wilderness area, the court deferred to 
the Forest Service’s model because (in the court’s words) the 
model “was developed over nearly two decades and includes 
extensive studies based on travel diaries, as well as expert opinion 
and a computer model. . . . The law is clear that a court may not 
second-guess methodological choices made by an agency in its 
area of expertise.”103 
In far fewer opinions, which nevertheless produce a 
formidable body of precedent, some courts take the opposite tack 
to approaching models as answer machines and reject a model 
when there is evidence of unresolved issues or uncertain 
calculations.  The judiciary’s rejection of models because the 
models are unable to produce definitive answers is evidenced in 
 
EPA’s explanations were not always as complete as the court wished, “the 
principles of administrative law do not demand perfection in the administrative 
process . . . . EPA went to great lengths to separately evaluate each and every 
chemical on the basis of the relevant data, and to make scientific and technical 
judgments which are clearly outside the expertise of a reviewing court.”), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Troy v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277 
(D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 99 The Supreme Court encouraged this super-deference in Baltimore Gas & 
Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1993) 
(“When examining this kind of scientific determination [i.e., one at the “frontiers 
of science”], as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must 
generally be at its most deferential.”). 
 100 Nat’l Oilseed Processors, 924 F. Supp. at 1209 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 101 Glicksman, supra note 20, at 492. 
 102 Id. at 484–86, 492. 
 103 Id. at 493, quoting Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. Schultz, 992 F.2d 
977, 981 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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several high profile cases that may have played an equal or even 
more important role in influencing agency behavior.104 A 
particularly good example of this premature rejection of a robust 
computational model is Gulf South Insulation v. Consumer 
Product Safety Commission, in which the court overturned the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission’s (CPSC) ban on the use of 
urea-formaldehyde insulation (UFFI) in residences and schools.105  
Much of this invalidation of CPSC’s rule was based on the court’s 
underlying rejection of the agency’s use of a “Global 79” risk 
assessment model used to predict the increased risk of cancer to a 
person living in a UFFI home.  The court found CPSC’s policy-
based assumption in that model, which extrapolated human effects 
from one large rat study, to be arbitrary.106  “To make precise 
estimates,” the court reasoned, “precise data are required.”107  The 
court’s opinion flew in the face of many cases upholding the 
ability of agencies to extrapolate laboratory animal data to humans 
when human evidence is scarce,108 and the court seemed to reject 
 
 104 See Daniel A. Farber, Modeling Climate Change and its Impacts: Law, 
Policy, and Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1675–77 (2008) (discussing Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow standard for admissibility of expert evidence and the effect of 
this ruling on courts’ acceptance of models). 
 105 701 F.2d 1137, 1143–47 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 106 Id. at 1146. 
 107 Id.  Legal scholars and scientists have been very critical of the Gulf South 
opinion, accusing the court of overreaching in an area that was beyond judicial 
competence.  See Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk 
Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 130–31 (1988) (“The court’s opinion 
reflects . . . a fundamental misunderstanding of the limited evidence on which 
most risk assessments of carcinogens are based.”); Richard A. Merrill, The Legal 
System’s Response to Scientific Uncertainty: The Role of Judicial Review, 4 
FUNDAMENTAL & APPLIED TOXICOLOGY 418, 424–25 (1984) (“The opinion’s 
close scrutiny of an exercise that is fraught with uncertainty, but yet promises 
improvement in regulation of health hazards, is disconcerting.”); Nicholas A. 
Ashford et al., A Hard Look at Federal Regulation of Formaldehyde: A 
Departure from Reasoned Decisionmaking, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 363–
68 (1983) (“[W]e find the Fifth Circuit’s analysis to be unpersuasive in its 
evaluation of CPSC’s cancer risk assessment for formaldehyde.”).  But see Cass 
R. Sunstein, In Defense of the Hard Look: Judicial Activism and Administrative 
Law, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 53 (1984) (praising the Fifth Circuit for 
relying on the hard look doctrine to “ensure that regulatory controls are well-
founded” and to promote “private ordering”). 
 108 See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. [EDF] v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 
86–89 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (upholding EPA rule on PCB discharges based in part on 
animal cancer studies); Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 110 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(finding EPA’s “concern” about carcinogenicity of pesticide in context of setting 
an “ample margin of safety” was adequately supported by animal study); EDF v. 
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the model because it disappointed the judiciary’s unrealistic 
demand for empirical decisiveness. 
In Leather Industries of America, Inc. v. EPA, the D.C. 
Circuit invalidated EPA’s model in part because it was dissatisfied 
with an assumption built into the model regarding the 
phytotoxicity of selenium.109  Even though EPA relied upon some 
preliminary research and other logical assumptions to justify the 
level it selected for selenium in the model, the court held that more 
data-backed justification was required.  “While the EPA may err 
on the side of overprotection, it may not engage in sheer 
guesswork.”110  The court did not suggest, however, that the 
agency had ignored relevant information, nor did it explain how 
the EPA would go about gathering additional information. 
In Ohio v. EPA (Ohio I), the Sixth Circuit rejected an EPA air 
model because EPA had failed to benchmark its computerized 
atmospheric model, CRSTER, against real data collected from the 
particular locale.111  On petition for rehearing, the court upheld its 
earlier ruling that EPA had not adequately demonstrated that the 
CRSTER model took into account the “specific meteorological and 
geographic problems” of the emissions of sulfur dioxide from the 
smokestacks of two power plants.112  As a result, EPA’s model 
allowed for too much sulfur dioxide in an area that was already 
designated nonattainment for that particular pollutant.  The court 
held this type of ground-testing of a model to essentially be 
required before EPA could legally employ the model to determine 
emissions limits, and it was arbitrary for EPA to allow a 400 
percent increase in emissions without validation or empirical 
testing of the model at the site.113  While the court seemed to base 
its holding in part on EPA’s failure to comply with an earlier 
 
Costle, 578 F.2d 337, 345 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing evidence of carcinogenicity of 
water pollutants based on animal studies); EDF v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1005–08 
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (allowing EPA to extrapolate from mice and rat studies of 
carcinogenicity of pesticides). 
 109 40 F.3d 392, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 110 Id. at 408 (internal quotations omitted). 
 111 784 F.2d 224, 228–31 (6th Cir. 1986). 
 112 Ohio v. EPA (Ohio II), 798 F.2d 880, 882 (6th Cir. 1986). 
 113 Ohio I, 784 F.2d at 231; Ohio II, 798 F.2d at 882.  For a sharp critique of 
the approach taken by the court in Ohio v. EPA, see Michael S. McMahon and 
Steven D. Hinkle, State of Ohio v. EPA: Does the Sixth Circuit Have a New 
Standard for Its Review of the EPA’s Use of Air Quality Modeling?, 18 U. TOL. 
L. REV. 569, 582–85 (1987). 
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remand requiring the agency to collect ambient data on sulfur 
dioxide concentrations in the area, the panel went further to state 
an overarching expectation that an agency must “back up its 
regulations [and models] with checks against real world data” 
generated for the particular site where the model is applied.114  The 
possibilities that this data might be quite expensive to collect, 
might be quite limited in terms of its locale-specific value, and 
might take more than a year to gather were effectively dismissed 
as illegitimate reasons to depart from this rigorous validation 
requirement.115  Indeed, the fact that the model had already been 
validated in other locales only strengthened the case, in the court’s 
view, for requiring similar types of locale-specific tests in the 
application of the model to these two power plants.116  The 
decision effectively hamstrung the ability of agencies to rely on 
models when data is too time-consuming or expensive to collect by 
demanding location-specific data to ground test the model. 
A similar misunderstanding of models as truth machines can 
be seen in an analysis of scientific admissibility rulings in private 
tort litigation, many of which involve environmental disputes.  
There are significant conflicts between the Supreme Court’s 
deterministic test for admissibility of expert testimony (embodied 
in part in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals)117 and the true 
nature of models.118  Perhaps most problematic was the Court’s 
standard that a model be falsifiable and testable.  As Swinehart 
observes: 
Instead of considering the viability of the model as a whole, a 
falsifiability examination invariably focuses on finding fault 
with the constituent parts of a model—its assumptions, 
algorithms, and data set—robbing a valid model of its 
 
 114 Ohio I, 784 F.2d at 230. 
 115 Id. at 229. 
 116 Id. at 229–231. 
 117 509 U.S. 579, 592–595 (1993).  The court interpreted Rule 702 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence to ask of a scientific “theory or technique” (1) 
whether it is capable of “testing” to see if it can be “falsified”; (2) whether it has 
been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) what is its “known or potential 
error rate”; (4) what are the “standards controlling the technique’s operation”; 
and finally (5) whether it is “generally accepted” within the scientific 
community.  The inquiry is “flexible” and the factors should not be considered 
determinative or exhaustive.  Id. 
 118 Swinehart, supra note 36, at 1301–11 (reviewing each of the Daubert 
factors and describing problems with applying the standards to determine the 
reliability of models). 
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coherency, while possibly upholding an ultimately flawed 
model that is composed of “good” parts.119 
In his extensive analysis of toxic tort litigation Carl Cranor 
observes a somewhat similar phenomenon: Some courts exclude 
expert testimony based on animal models and related research 
“simply because it does not represent a complete or definitive 
answer to a larger policy or science question.”120  These courts find 
that these “weight of the evidence” models are insufficiently 
rigorous or probative and insist instead that plaintiffs support their 
causation claims with epidemiological research, despite the fact 
that this evidence is often unavailable or inconclusive.121 
2. Implications for Policy Analysis 
The dominant view of models as ‘fact-generators’ is not only 
wrong—or at least at odds with what we know models to be—but 
it also leads to a series of problems that get in the way of the high 
quality use of models for policy analysis.  A variety of 
misconceptions radiate from this central misunderstanding.  See 
Table 2.  We discuss a few of the most important ramifications of 
these misunderstandings here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 119 Id. at 1305. 
 120 See Carl F. Cranor, The Dual Legacy of Daubert v. Merrell-Dow 
Pharmaceutical: Trading Junk Science for Insidious Science, in RESCUING 
SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC 
RESEARCH 120, 121, 126 (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds. 2006). 
 121 Id. 
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Table 2.  The Proper Way to Understand Models vs. Models Misunderstood as 
“Answer Machines” 
 Models properly 
understood  
Models misunderstood as 
“Answer Machines”  
Purpose of Model To assist in problem solving; 
to spark deliberation 
To prove that a regulation is 
supported by “sound science”  
Basis of Model Analysis; judgment based on 
experience; assumptions 
Scientific analysis, without 
any policy or related 
judgments 
Scientific uncertainty Inherent feature that needs to 
be explained 
Undesirable feature that needs 
to be reduced: uncertainty can 
undercut the perceived 
reliability of a model 
Model output Dynamic, iterative process Static, one-time answer 
Primary 
Administrative 
Purpose 
To aid in the process of 
establishing reasons for 
regulating 
Accurately proving a 
relationship between source 
and effect 
Relationship to Public 
Participation  
Facilitate deliberation among 
disparate parties 
No relationship: public 
participation is inappropriate 
for this “scientific” exercise 
Approaches to Public 
Administration122 
Deliberative-Constitutive  Rational-Instrumental 
Accountability  Through showing that there 
has been an effective 
problem-solving process 
Through showing accuracy 
and adherence to the 
legislative mandate  
Means of Assessing 
the Quality of the 
Model 
Through assessing how it has 
contributed to problem-
solving  
Through assessing the 
model’s accuracy 
 
First, the view of models as “truth generators” is likely to give 
policymakers the unrealistic expectation that a single “perfect” 
model will produce the truth.  Modelers, by contrast, generally 
take the view that multiple models are essential to good modeling 
and that reliance on a single model is likely to lead to serious blind 
spots and make poor use of models.123  In keeping with their 
misunderstanding, however, policymakers may dismiss efforts by 
 
 122 ELIZABETH FISHER, RISK REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 26–35 (2007).  “The rational-instrumental theory of 
administrative constitutionalism construes public administration to be an 
‘instrument’ of the legislature—a ‘robot’ or ‘transmission belt’ whose task is 
strictly to obey the pre-ordained democratic will as it is expressed in legislation.”  
Id. at 28.  In contrast, the deliberative-constitutive paradigm “promotes a model 
of public administration that is designed to address the factual and normative 
complexities of technological risk evaluation by granting to public administration 
substantial and ongoing problem-solving discretion in relation to particular 
issues.”  Id. at 30. 
 123 See, e.g., Farber, supra note 104, at 1666–67 (discussing the importance of 
using multiple models in the climate change modeling context). 
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scientists to model scenarios using alternative assumptions or to 
employ different models in order to reach a better understanding of 
a system.124  The policymakers’ understanding that good modeling 
culminates in a single, perfect model thus diverges significantly 
from what modelers view as appropriate and correct. 
Second, a fact-generator view of models causes policymakers 
and judges to be caught in a paradox.  On the one hand, they view 
themselves as the non-participating recipient of a model product, 
and as such under no obligation to acknowledge the values and 
policy inputs that are needed to frame the proper development of 
the model.125  Indeed, such acknowledgement runs counter to an 
understanding of models as “truth machines.” 
On the other hand, the values and policy inputs become 
blatantly obvious in any dispute over the model.  Thus, for 
example, in a recent English legal challenge to a risk assessment 
concerning the health risks from crop spraying the judge noted, 
“[W]e are here at the very fringe of what should properly be the 
subject of judicial review,” while at the same time finding himself 
drawn into arguments about the veracity and quality of the 
model.126  In that case, a risk assessment model for bystander 
pesticide exposure was developed by the UK Department of 
Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) to fulfill its 
obligations under EU law.  The model, however, was heavily 
criticized by another independent government body, the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution, which argued that it 
should be “replaced by a computational model which is 
probabilistic, looks at a wider range of possible exposure routes 
and more robustly reflects worst case outcomes.”127  In particular, 
the risk model did not consider either cumulative risks (that often 
occur over years or even a lifetime) or risks to particularly 
susceptible groups, such as children.  
 
 124 The value of multiple models and multiple scenarios in using models for 
policy is well-established in the modeling literature.  See, e.g., Robert Evans, 
Economic Models and Economic Policy: What Economic Forecasters Can Do 
for Government, in EMPIRICAL MODELS AND POLICY-MAKING 206, 222–24 
(Frank A.G. den Butter & Mary S. Morgan eds., 2000). 
 125 See NRC, supra note 13, at 92–93 (describing the central importance of 
delimiting the purpose of the models). 
 126 Downs v. Sec’y of State for Env’t, Food & Rural Affairs, [2008] EWHC 
(QB) 2666, [38]. 
 127 Sec’y of State for Env’t, Food & Rural Affairs v. Downs, [2009] EWCA 
(Civ) 664, [4]–[8] (U.K.) (appeal taken from Q.B.). 
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Thus while the judge made clear that “the alleged 
inadequacies of the model and the approach to authorization and 
conditions of use have been scientifically justified,”128 he found 
himself reviewing the decision closely and ultimately striking it 
down.  Moreover, this decision was appealed and the Court of 
Appeal also found itself drawn into the arguments concerning the 
assumptions on which DEFRA’s models were based.129  It also 
came to a different conclusion.  Likewise, the use of models in the 
evaluation of medicinal drugs by the English National Health 
Service has raised a number of legal challenges concerning the 
procedural rights in relation to access to models.130  Models may 
be highly technical but they raise fundamental legal questions 
about basic issues such as what is procedurally fair. 
Models are thus not separate from regulatory and legal 
decision-making.  They are deeply intertwined, and as a result a 
more effective use of models for regulation requires continuous 
interactions between policymakers and modelers in developing 
models that answer the right questions and use the appropriate 
assumptions.131  If policymakers instead view themselves as 
wholly detached from the modeling exercise and only as 
consumers of model products (at least until the model comes under 
challenge), they miss the opportunity to engage in these critical 
decisions that may be made without them.  Moreover, they remain 
largely oblivious to the fundamental questions that models raise, 
but are unable to answer. 
 
 128 Downs v. Sec’y of State for Env’t, Food & Rural Affairs, [2008] EWHC 
(QB) 2666, [39]. 
 129 Sec’y of State for Env’t, Food & Rural Affairs v. Downs, [2009] EWCA 
(Civ) 664, [4]–[8] (U.K.) (appeal taken from Q.B.). 
 130 Eisai Ltd, R (on the application of) v. National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) [2008] EWCA (Civ) 438 (01 May 2008); Servier 
Laboratories Ltd, R (on the application of) v. National Institute for Health & 
Clinical Excellence & Ors [2009] EWHC (Admin) 281 (19 February 2009); 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Pharmaceuticals Ltd, R (on the application of) v. National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence [2009] EWHC (Admin) 2722 (06 
November 2009). 
 131 Hali J. Edison & Jaime Marquez, U.S. Monetary Policy and Econometric 
Modeling: Tales from the FOMC Transcripts 1984–91, in EMPIRICAL MODELS 
AND POLICY-MAKING, supra note 124, at 187, 203 (concluding that “far from 
being mechanistic providers of policy constraints, models shape and are shaped 
by the judgment of policy makers”); see also Frank A.G. den Butter & Mary S. 
Morgan, Preface, in EMPIRICAL MODELS AND POLICY-MAKING, supra note 124, 
at xiv, xiv (noting that the interaction between modelers and policy-makers is 
important but under-researched). 
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Third, policymakers who view models as truth machines 
believe they are receiving answers from models that resolve a 
problem once and for all.  They will tend to be content with very 
limited or nonexistent expressions of the uncertainty and 
assumptions within a model, and they will be inclined to codify the 
models into policy, without providing any means of updating or 
revising the models in adaptive fashion.  Under existing 
administrative law this inclination for static, precise model outputs 
follows the path of least resistance.  An outdated but “final” model 
supporting a rule is generally immune from challenge; but as soon 
as the agency revises the model supporting that rule, multiple 
layers of regulatory oversight begin anew.132  For example, when 
minor errors are discovered in a model or slight adjustments are 
needed to an algorithm, the agency risks being challenged if it does 
not engage in full notice and comment on the model changes since 
the challenger can argue that the adjustments were material 
changes that required public participation.133 Again, this wrong-
headed approach to models as static “answer machines” causes 
policymakers to lose much of what the model has to offer in terms 
of highlighting the dynamic nature of the system. 
Finally, a “fact generator” view of models could lead to 
adverse reactions in other arenas.134  An unrealistic expectation 
 
 132 Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive 
Regulation, and the Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1712–
15 (2008) (describing the problem of rulemaking ruts that impede the revision of 
standards and models used to set those standards); NRC, supra note 13, at 166–
67 (“In such an adversarial environment, [the agency] might perceive that a 
rigorous life-cycle model evaluation is ill-advised . . . . [R]eview may expose the 
model to a greater risk of challenges . . . because the agency is documenting 
features of its models that need to be improved.”). 
 133 Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 893–900 (2007) (criticizing courts for expansive 
interpretation of the “meagre” statutory requirements of the Administrative 
Procedure Act to mandate that agencies go through a follow-up notice and 
comment process whenever a final rule is not the “logical outgrowth” of the 
proposed rule, and discussing how this impedes agency adaptability to new 
information during the notice and comment period). 
 134 This same phenomenon was noticed in some policymakers’ use of 
economic models, which seem more susceptible to common-sense limitations in 
their accuracy.  See, e.g., John Bradley, Policy Design and Evaluation: EU 
Structural Funds and Cohesion in the European Periphery, in EMPIRICAL 
MODELS AND POLICY-MAKING, supra note 124, at 129, 143 (observing from case 
study that “the policy makers were posing empirical questions to the modelers 
that were almost impossible to answer adequately with the present state of 
knowledge”). 
WAGNER.MACRO.FORAUTHORS.FINAL.DOC 5/12/2010  2:05:31 PM 
330 N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Volume 18 
that models will resolve policy problems can lead to unnecessary 
expense and delay in reaching solutions to pressing policy 
problems when a model disappoints these expectations.135  As we 
suggest in the next two sections, this misunderstanding also 
provides fodder for strategic manipulation and model 
misrepresentation.  For example, it puts a strain on modelers who 
find themselves in the difficult position of either disappointing 
policymakers, with the attendant adverse consequences for 
possible future funding, or providing unreliable answers for 
policymakers who might not fully appreciate the limitations in the 
model output. 
The view of models as truth machines, then, is not innocuous.  
Instead it leads to policymaking approaches that miss the true 
value of models and distort their outputs in damaging ways.  Even 
more concerning is the possibility that this “answer machine” view 
is particularly engrained in the U.S. administrative system of 
regulatory decision-making as compared with other countries.  
Fisher documents how debates over public administration in 
environmental and public health regulation have swung between 
two different extremes that vary, in large part, in their attitude 
towards technical tools like models.136  One approach—generally 
not followed in the U.S.—views administrative policymaking as a 
substantial and ongoing problem-solving exercise between experts 
and affected parties in a cooperative, non-adversarial setting (the 
Deliberative-Constitutive paradigm).137  In this type of decision-
making environment, models are viewed more realistically as 
highly contingent and uncertain, but still quite useful for the light 
they shed on a problem.  Fisher isolates certain policymaking 
events in Australia and Great Britain that represent this type of 
deliberative approach where regulatory outcomes are based on a 
 
 135 See, e.g., DANIEL SAREWITZ, FRONTIERS OF ILLUSION: SCIENCE, 
TECHNOLOGY, AND THE POLITICS OF PROGRESS 86 (1996) (“[P]oliticians [will 
not] find that an improved understanding of the intricacies of atmospheric 
process can much help them to evaluate policy options for responding to global 
change.”); Leslie Roberts, Learning from an Acid Rain Program, 251 SCI. 1302, 
1304–05 (1991) (describing a five-year gap between the time Congress stopped 
asking about the scientific basis of acid rain and moved on to political questions 
of who would pay, and the release of the authoritative scientific report on acid 
rain.  The time-consuming scientific effort produced “an extraordinary model, 
capable of dazzling resolution,” but too late for Congress and at the expense of 
“simpler models that would have been more useful for policy analysis.”). 
 136 FISHER, supra note 122, at 26–35. 
 137 See id. at 30–33. 
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range of factors, of which multiple models would be part.138 
 Since at least 1980, U.S. courts have largely rejected this 
more flexible and cooperative approach to decision-making, 
instead favoring a technocratic approach to policy development 
that relies on “answers” generated from technical and empirical 
analysis (the Rational-Instrumental paradigm).139  This Rational-
Instrumental paradigm is reinforced by strategic calls for “sound 
science” as the prerequisite for regulation, which in turn leads to 
the mistaken view that science provides a neutral and complete 
answer that can be neatly fitted into a policy need or question.140  
According to this paradigm, public administration is an 
“instrument” of the legislature—a “transmission belt”—whose task 
is strictly to obey the pre-ordained democratic will as it is 
expressed in legislation.141 In so doing, an agency acts simply by 
identifying, assessing, and applying the relevant facts and value 
preferences to the issue at hand.142  This perspective fortifies the 
view of models as “truth generators.”  The malleability and 
uncertain nature of models is simply irreconcilable with a vision of 
decision-making that proceeds with technocratic answers and 
processes.  While the administrative law process alone does not 
lead inevitably to this technocratic perspective of models, over the 
years it has become the dominant view that tends to crowd out a 
more scientifically realistic and conditional view of models. 
3. Summary 
The misunderstanding of models as truth generators is 
reflected in the basic constitution of contemporary U.S. 
 
 138 Id. at 48–88, 125–161. 
 139 See id. at ch. 3.  Elements of this approach can be seen in the following 
sources: THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 10–16 (1991) 
(comprehensive analytical rationality); MARTIN SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 67–91 (1968) (synoptic model); CASS 
SUNSTEIN, THE COST BENEFIT STATE 19–29 (2002) (cost-benefit analysis); MAX 
WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196–244 (H.H. Gerth & C. 
Wright Mills eds. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1946) (theory of bureaucracy); 
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. 
L. REV. 1667 (1975) (interest representation model). 
 140 See, e.g., Chris Mooney, Op-Ed., Beware Sound Science: It’s Doublespeak 
for Trouble, WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 2004, at B2. 
 141 Stewart, supra note 139, at 1675. 
 142 See FISHER, supra note 122, at 28–29. 
WAGNER.MACRO.FORAUTHORS.FINAL.DOC 5/12/2010  2:05:31 PM 
332 N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Volume 18 
administrative law and expressed through a number of regulatory 
programs.  Yet this misunderstanding is decidedly problematic if 
the goal is to encourage the smart use of models for environmental 
policy.  Models are not just products of theory and data but also 
are shaped by the priorities of the decision-makers who are 
deploying them.143  If the policymakers are unaware of their own 
critical role in model development, and also have little clue about 
how to use model outputs in an accurate or useful way, then much 
of what models have to offer policy will be lost.  Models do not 
generate final answers, but they do generate useful insights that aid 
both deliberation and analysis.  Without an appreciation for the 
difference, the agency runs the risk of accepting badly incomplete 
answers and missing the true value of models. 
B. Weaknesses in Modeling Science that Do Not Dispel,  
and May Even Reinforce, the Misunderstanding of  
Models as “Truth Machines” 
The fact generator view of models would ideally be shattered 
by scientists who provide extensive discussions of uncertainties, 
assumptions, and related contingencies of models.  But this is not 
occurring, or at least not occurring in a regularized, consistent 
way.144  This section explores why scientists have not managed to 
overthrow policymakers’ misconception of models as truth 
machines, and how their inactivity may be partly to blame for 
exacerbating existing misunderstandings between science and 
 
 143 In this regard it can be thought of as a subset of “regulatory science.”  See 
SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS 80 
(1990) (comparing regulatory science, practiced by government agencies and 
regulatory stakeholders in pursuit of “policy truths” and subject to political 
pressure for timely and definitive answers, with university-based research 
science, an open-ended search for “truths of originality and significance”). 
 144 One computer model may contain dozens of hidden policy assumptions, 
which exert a profound effect on the resulting numerical standard.  See, e.g., 
JOHN D. GRAHAM ET AL., IN SEARCH OF SAFETY: CHEMICALS AND CANCER RISK 
158–159 (1988) (comparing widely-varying formaldehyde risk estimates for rats 
based on alternative mathematical models, and noting that agencies, when 
choosing between models, adopt methods and “intentionally aim high” from a 
fear of underestimating cancer risks).  The choice of a model, however, is rarely, 
if ever, presented in its full mixed science-policy light.  Charles D. Case, 
Problems in Judicial Review Arising from the Use of Computer Models and 
Other Quantitative Methodologies in Environmental Decisionmaking, 10 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 251, 276 (1982) (“There is often a tendency on the part of 
these experts . . . to give an inadequate disclosure of the actual methodologies 
used and the limitations of the results that their studies produce.”). 
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policy. 
Much of the modelers’ silence about, or even complicity in, 
the misunderstanding of policymakers may be due to the fact that 
computational modeling is a relatively new field.  As such, 
modelers may simply not be sufficiently organized to provide a 
coherent corrective to this pervasive misunderstanding.145  Indeed, 
perhaps because computational modeling is struggling for 
acceptance and authority, modelers might find that policymakers’ 
misunderstandings cut in their favor. 
The absence of a set of accepted best practice principles to 
guide high-quality computational modeling may be the most 
significant void in modeling science.  This missing ingredient may 
be a consequence of the fledgling state of the science, but the 
absence of accepted best practices could also be attributed to the 
fact that models are often developed by scientists from a wide 
variety of disciplinary areas like meteorology, hydrology, risk 
assessment, and economic analysis.  These disciplines have few 
opportunities to communicate with one another, which impedes 
their collective ability to develop generally accepted principles for 
modeling.  The varying uses of models in regulation—ranging 
from primitive research tools to finely-tuned instruments for 
predicting change—further complicate the ability to create a “one 
size fits all” set of best practices for the use of models in policy.146 
Without a coherent set of best practice guidelines, however, it 
is difficult for modelers to provide a counterweight to 
policymakers’ expectations of models as fact generators.  Instead, 
the flexible, even permissive space within which modeling occurs 
allows for models to be portrayed as fact generators without 
consequence.147  Because policymakers want “outputs” and 
 
 145 See NRC, supra note 13, at 20–21 (discussing the rapid growth in 
modeling over the past twenty-five years and the gradual shift in understanding 
about models). 
 146 See id. at 56–62 (describing the varied uses of models by the EPA to 
determine when to regulate, how much to regulate, for determining compliance, 
to set penalties, and to assess the success of regulatory efforts).  Nevertheless, as 
discussed in Part III infra, it may still be possible to develop best practices to 
foster regulatory models that are transparent and conform to the scientific 
evidence.  For example, modelers should disclose the role of sponsors in model 
development when those models are used for regulation; should account for the 
assumptions underlying their inferences (e.g., does a model assume that the data 
conform to a normal distribution?); and should constantly re-evaluate their 
models in light of changing theories or new data. 
 147 Efforts by climate change modelers to develop rigorous, consensus-based 
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assume them to be correct, diverse and even sloppy practices can 
occur with some frequency. 
A second challenge faced by modelers is how to appropriately 
characterize uncertainty.  As discussed in Part I.C., multiple 
sources of uncertainty are embedded in the basic steps of model 
development.  The diversity of models and of disciplines using 
models make the communication of these fundamental 
uncertainties challenging because of the lack of a generally 
accepted approach to characterizing uncertainty.  Expectations that 
the model will provide a decisive answer compound these 
challenges substantially since the audience is not even receptive to 
such a discussion. 
Again, by acceding to or failing to correct policymakers’ 
unrealistic demands for answers there is a danger that some 
modelers will inadvertently reinforce core misunderstandings.  
Indeed, some modelers may conscientiously comply when asked 
by policymakers for a single answer or even a point estimate.  
These modelers may present their models as “answer machines” 
and model outputs as point estimate “truths” without violating 
scientific codes or any unwritten mutual understandings of good 
modeling science.  As a result, policymakers may assume from 
these decisive-looking outputs that their understanding of models 
as answer-machines is correct while at the same time rewarding 
modelers who help satisfy their unrealistic expectations.  Through 
this vicious cycle, the model misunderstandings can grow more 
and more entrenched. 
Finally, with some exceptions modelers have not yet agreed 
on general principles for comparing models or separating out the 
good from the bad, again creating room for poor modeling 
practices.  Some models will do better than others in representing 
the empirical world, but modelers lack a coherent framework for 
distinguishing between models with regard to the appropriateness 
of the analytical methods and assumptions in a given setting.148  
 
models have led to much more comprehensive forms of scientific oversight in 
areas of physical climate change modeling.  Farber, supra note 104, at 1658 
(describing how “[c]limate scientists have created a unique institutional system 
for assessing and improving models, going well beyond the usual system of peer 
review”).  Vetting efforts involve standardized experiments carried out 
internationally by different modeling groups, model intercomparison projects, 
and an archive of models and outputs available for study by the working groups 
and independent researchers.  Id. at 1677–78. 
 148 See Swinehart, supra note 36, at 1290–91 (discussing how difficult it is for 
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For example, many models rely on the basic assumption that the 
relationships among the components of a model can be estimated 
using a latent structure of probabilities. It is extremely difficult to 
ascertain whether this assumption conforms to physical reality, 
however.  As Box and Draper remind us: “[A]ll models are wrong; 
the practical question is how wrong do they have to be to not be 
useful.”149  Modelers do not yet have clear standards to explore 
and answer that question.  
An industry challenge to EPA’s regulations and a report from 
the National Research Council highlight why this current gap in 
modeling science is so important.  When assessing the risk from 
chemical pollutants, EPA typically relies on so-called default 
options to facilitate inferences in the face of scientific uncertainty.  
For example, absent evidence to establish the biological mode of 
action for a tumor site, the relationship between the chemical dose 
and a carcinogenic response is assumed, by default, to be linear.150  
A linear model can be used to argue that there is a cancer risk 
associated with a chemical for any dose above zero.  In 1998 EPA 
used such a linear model to promulgate a rule setting the standard 
for chloroform in drinking water at zero parts per million.  The 
rule was overturned when the Chlorine Chemistry Council argued 
successfully that EPA disregarded evidence that chloroform is a 
threshold carcinogen requiring an alternative, non-linear model.151  
In a recent report, an NRC panel recommended that EPA replace a 
default assumption when the underlying evidence is “clearly 
superior” to that for the default.152 
The panel equated the “clearly superior” evidential standard 
to a “beyond a reasonable doubt” legal standard and advised 
against interpreting this term quantitatively.153  But because the 
rules used to evaluate model performance are incoherent, it is 
difficult to state why the “clearly superior” evidence embodied in a 
proposed model should trump the use of defaults.  The need to 
 
the modeler “to determine which modeling methodology will most accurately 
portray the chosen modeling parameters in light of the collected empirical data”). 
 149 BOX & DRAPER, supra note 12, at 74. 
 150 RISK ASSESSMENT FORUM, EPA, GUIDELINES FOR CARCINOGEN RISK 
ASSESSMENT § 1.3.2 (2005). 
 151 Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286, 1290–91 (D.C. Cir. 
2000). 
 152 NRC, SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 50, at 201. 
 153 Id. at n.7. 
WAGNER.MACRO.FORAUTHORS.FINAL.DOC 5/12/2010  2:05:31 PM 
336 N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Volume 18 
develop coherent rules for evaluating evidence embodied in a 
model was in fact highlighted by a panel member, who observed 
that replacing default assumptions has less to do with actually 
gathering new data about risk, but instead about developing 
competing inferences from alternative models based on existing 
data.154  The panel even hinted at the existence of some formal 
rules for model evaluation, pointing to the statistical P value as an 
analogy for how one might determine that evidence is “clearly 
superior.”155  Beyond this, however, the panel offered little 
guidance on how to determine how this “clearly superior” 
evidentiary standard might be met.156  Instead, it turned to EPA to 
resolve this question.  The question still remains unresolved: on 
what basis can it be said that one model provides stronger evidence 
of an environmental event, rather than another? 
While general principles for model comparison cannot be 
hard and fast rules, the absence of guidelines makes for a soft 
scientific base in model evaluations and comparisons. 
C. Models and Strategic Game-Playing 
Fueled by gaps in modeling science, the ripple effects from a 
core misunderstanding of models by policymakers radiate out to an 
even more undesirable set of adverse consequences occurring 
within the regulatory state itself.  Many rulemakings have 
significant economic implications for one or more affected 
industries, and strategic actors face incentives to exploit the 
misunderstanding of models as “answer machines” to advance 
their own narrow ends. 
There are three intimately related but distinguishable 
strategies that a devious regulatory participant can deploy to reap 
 
 154 Id. at 190–91, 191 n.2. 
 155 NRC, SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 50, at 201.  The committee 
explained that “clearly superior” should be taken to mean that the “plausibility 
[of an alternative assumption] clearly exceeds the plausibility of the default,” and 
equated “clearly superior” to a “beyond a reasonable doubt” legal standard.  Id. 
at n.7. 
 156 The NRC report addressed this issue and, in an interesting foot-noted 
discussion, one of the panel members observed that the choice to forgo a default 
model in favor of an ad hoc examination of the data and possible alternatives 
often has less to do with having access to better data, but rather with choosing 
“among models (inferences, assumptions), which are not themselves ‘data’ but 
which are ways of making sense of data.”  NRC, SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra 
note 50, at 190–91, 191 n.2 (2009) (emphasis in the original). 
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benefits from the prevailing misunderstanding of models.  The first 
exploits the false expectation that models are fact generators.  
From the agency’s perspective, portraying models as answer 
machines allows the agency to sidestep at least some unpleasant 
accountability and controversy by shrugging off criticism with the 
response that the “model made me do it.”  Agencies may thus 
choose to do this, even when they know better, because it protects 
them from scrutiny by institutional authorities like Congress and 
the courts.157  Examples abound of agencies perpetuating the 
misunderstanding of models as answer machines, while at the 
same time secretly cramming contested, value-laden assumptions 
into their highly technical models behind the scenes.  In the areas 
of risk assessment, public land management, and even economic 
modeling, the propensity of agencies to use models as facades for 
underlying value choices is well established.158  As Glicksman 
 
 157 Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1654–69 (1995) (discussing incentives for agencies to 
exaggerate the scientific basis for regulation). 
 158 See TED GREENWOOD, KNOWLEDGE AND DISCRETION IN GOVERNMENT 
REGULATION 18–19 (1984) (distinguishing knowledge (i.e., scientific expertise) 
from discretion, and warning that, although most regulatory decisions require 
agencies to exercise both, “advocates—both inside and outside agencies—
can . . . readily disguise advocacy and discretion as knowledge”); see also, e.g., 
Holly Doremus, Using Science in a Political World: The Importance of 
Transparency in Natural Resource Regulation, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM 
POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 143, 147–
59 (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds., 2006) (describing how stakeholders in 
endangered species management prefer “couching their claims as scientific ones 
to openly arguing for their values,” even though regulatory decisions 
“inevitably” require policy judgments); Winston Harrington et al., What We 
Learned, in RES. FOR THE FUTURE, REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 
215, 224 (Winston Harrington et al. eds., 2009) (discussing the false appearance 
of precision in complex and lengthy regulatory impact analyses); MARC K. 
LANDY ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING THE WRONG 
QUESTIONS 279 (1990) (describing how EPA misled the public on issues of 
safety and regulatory costs through the use of scientific explanations that obscure 
underlying policy judgments and distort the relative significance of the 
problems); MARK E. RUSHEFSKY, MAKING CANCER POLICY 6, 13–17 (1986) 
(criticizing EPA’s public distinction between risk assessment (supposedly 
objective, scientific) and risk management (subjective, value-laden, political) for 
carcinogens as unrealistic and misleading, and therefore subject to political 
abuse); Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of 
Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1290–91 (2004) 
(describing EPA’s attempt to “cloak [its] policy decisions in science” as a 
“charade” to justify ambient air standards for ozone and fine particulate matter); 
Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 
YALE J. ON REG. 89, 93–95 (1988) (discussing how model-based risk assessment 
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notes, “[T]he use of modeling by [public land agencies] is 
susceptible to the criticism that the agencies, intentionally or not, 
have masked their value judgments in the language of technical 
determinations.”159 
In a related vein, the rational agency may not only find itself 
tacitly rewarded for misrepresenting its model as an “answer 
machine” but, quite independent from that, will find it beneficial to 
be opaque about assumptions and uncertainties incorporated into 
the model, even if it ultimately concedes the tentative nature of the 
modeling exercise.  This opacity helps insulate the agency’s many 
assumptions and modeling decisions from critical review, 
particularly by adversarial stakeholders.  As Glicksman observed 
in this context, agencies “can isolate themselves [in part] by 
making their decisions in secret, without soliciting the views of 
knowledgeable experts and lay persons.”160  This type of strategic 
opacity helps conceal from participants “the subjective decisions 
and policy choices made by planners and modelers during the 
modeling process.”161 
As a result, the prospect of an open season on agency models 
by aggressive stakeholders, coupled with the threat of a lawsuit 
over technical disagreements, create incentives for rational 
agencies to make their models relatively indecipherable with 
regard to the underlying assumptions and uncertainties.  Once a 
stakeholder engages with the agency’s model and begins asking 
fundamental questions about the framing and assumptions, it is 
less clear that an agency is wise to stonewall.  But, at least at the 
outset, developing an opaque model is a useful strategy to insulate 
the model and attendant policy decisions from critical review.  In 
their examination of the use of air models to determine the 
reductions needed to meet the national ambient ozone standard in 
 
has become the primary justification for standards-setting policy judgments for 
toxic hazards); Oreskes et al., supra note 66, at 642–43 (observing that modelers 
too quickly capitulate by presenting their model as producing a positive result, 
and quoting scientists as misrepresenting their models on those terms). 
 159 Glicksman, supra note 20, at 481–82; see also Holly Doremus, Listing 
Decisions under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science Isn’t Always 
Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1035 (1997) (criticizing the Endangered 
Species Act, which requires “science-only” listing decisions, for “forc[ing] 
listing agencies into a ‘science charade,’ in which they must pretend to make 
non-scientific decisions entirely on the basis of science”). 
 160 Glicksman, supra note 20, at 520. 
 161 Fine & Owen, supra note 24, at 932. 
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the San Joaquin Valley, Fine and Owen identify this pattern of 
agency behavior: 
[The agency’s] uncertainty discussions were far from 
comprehensive.  The [air quality] plan includes some blanket 
generalizations about the pervasiveness of uncertainty in 
modeling, but its discussion of particular sources of uncertainty 
was too general to allow a reader to discern how those 
uncertainties were managed or what economic and public 
health risks they might pose.162  
Indeed, opacity may be a safer legal strategy than conceding 
the stark limitations in models that undergird a regulatory 
decision.163  “Highlighting uncertainties associated with the 
technical basis for decisions can make the job of defending 
decisions more difficult, and decision-makers—and the attorneys 
who will ultimately represent them—may be reluctant to hear 
information that might undermine the certainty of their 
decisions.”164  Even more perversely, this opacity in models may 
be accepted as appropriate by policymakers and courts in light of 
their misunderstanding of models and the modelers’ own silence or 
failure to correct these misimpressions.165 
A different strategy that exploits this same erroneous 
portrayal of models as decisive demands an unobtainable level of 
empirical certainty,166 a demand that may succeed not only in 
blocking the use of the model, but in blocking the policy as well.167  
Given that uncertainty permeates the entire modeling process,168 a 
 
 162 Id. at 960; see also id. at 960–62 (describing the lack of discussion in 
detail). 
 163 See supra Part II.A.1. 
 164 Fine & Owen, supra note 24, at 929. 
 165 See supra Part II.B. 
 166 See Mooney, supra note 140 (arguing that political rallying cries for 
“sound science” and “peer review” are often used “to put a pro-science veneer” 
on “industry-friendly” policies that, in effect, would require “such exhaustive 
analysis that federal agencies could have a hard time taking prompt action to 
protect public health and the environment”). 
 167 See, e.g., Ellen Paul, Science: The Newest Political Football in the 
Endangered Species Game, 52 BIOSCIENCE 792 (2002) (describing how property 
rights advocates and land developers have vigorously argued that the incomplete 
status of the scientific research on the severity of most species’ decline were 
intended to deprive the Fish and Wildlife Service of authority to regulate private 
property under Endangered Species Act’s Habitat Preservation Program); Sasha 
Gennet, New ESA Amendments: Sound Science or Political Shell Game?, 54 
BIOSCIENCE 1070 (2004) (same). 
 168 See supra Part I.C. 
WAGNER.MACRO.FORAUTHORS.FINAL.DOC 5/12/2010  2:05:31 PM 
340 N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Volume 18 
resourceful stakeholder can demand perfection while running the 
agency’s preferred model so full of holes that it sets the regulatory 
effort adrift with scientific demands that can never be satisfied.169  
As Professor Farber observes, “[w]ords like uncertainty, 
systematic biases, and important deficiencies [used by modelers in 
describing their climate change models] are music to the ears of 
cross-examiners.”170 
These attacks on models, usually accompanied by clarion 
calls for “sound science,” occur even when Congress has 
demanded that an agency err on the side of protecting public 
health.  Under the George W. Bush administration, for example, 
despite being confronted with evidence from the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and from 
EPA’s own independent science panel regarding health and 
environmental threats from both CO2 and from particulate matter 
at levels lower than existing standards, EPA Administrator Steve 
Johnson declared that uncertainty precluded regulatory action on 
either front.171  (Ironically, it appears that robust characterizations 
of uncertainty were in part the basis for this rejection of the 
models.)  After judicial review, EPA’s decisions not to regulate in 
both cases were eventually overturned, in part because they lacked 
a rational basis in light of the available scientific evidence.172 
Interested parties have also pointed to specifically contestable 
coefficients in a model as failing to meet the demand for “sound 
science,” a deficiency that they argue necessitates the wholesale 
rejection of the model.173  Their objective is to destroy the 
 
 169 See generally MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 45, 128–56 (describing 
tactics used to discredit research and researchers). 
 170 Farber, supra note 104, at 1675. 
 171 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 513 (2007) (describing EPA 
uncertainties about the connection between greenhouse gas emissions and global 
temperatures); Janet Wilson, New EPA Rules on Soot and Dust Set, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 22, 2006, at B1 (EPA Administrator attributing his rejection of 
recommended annual limits on coarse particulate pollution on scientific 
uncertainty). 
 172 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 532–35 (“Nor can EPA avoid its 
statutory obligation by noting the uncertainty surrounding various features of 
climate change . . . . That EPA would prefer not to regulate greenhouse gases 
because of some residual uncertainty . . . is irrelevant.  The statutory question is 
whether sufficient information exists to make an endangerment finding.”); Am. 
Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 523–24 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (striking 
down parts of EPA’s particulate regulations as insufficiently supported). 
 173 See, e.g., David Michaels & Celeste Monforton, Manufacturing 
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credibility of “good” or “plausible” models by criticizing the 
model on every picky and generally insignificant detail.174  This 
was in fact an explicit strategy of the tobacco industry.175  Climate 
change models also appear to have been subject to this type of 
ends-oriented type of attack.  In a challenge mounted against 
several federal agencies under the Data Quality Act,176 for 
example, the petitioner, the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) 
(an organization funded in part by industries adversely affected by 
carbon reduction policies) argued that the National Assessment on 
Climate Change (NACC) models should be stricken from public 
databases because the models could not be “verified by observed 
data” and were therefore “junk science.”177  Specifically, CEI 
argued that: 
 
Uncertainty: Contested Science and the Protection of the Public’s Health and 
Environment, 95 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH (SUPPLEMENT ISSUE) S39, S41 (2005) 
(relating how the lead, asbestos, chemical, and tobacco industries have exploited 
scientific uncertainty to delay adoption of new regulations, and to challenge 
evidence of causation in toxic tort cases). 
 174 Thomas O. McGarity, Defending Clean Science from Dirty Attacks by 
Special Interests, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE 
DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 24 (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds., 
2006) (describing the “attack science” strategy of risk-producing industries bent 
on discrediting studies documenting the hazards of their trade and the scientists 
who engage in this research); see, e.g., Michaels & Monforton, supra note 173 
(reviewing several such “attack science” campaigns). 
 175 MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 45, at 138–139 (documenting Philip 
Morris’ public relations campaign to “discredit EPA’s report on ETS”); Michaels 
& Monforton, supra note 173, at S40, S43. 
 176 The Data Quality Act originated as a two-paragraph rider in a 2001 
appropriations bill.  Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for 
Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106–554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153 to -
154.  It directs the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to issue 
government-wide guidelines to “ensure and maximize data quality,” and to 
establish procedures allowing formal challenges to information disseminated by 
federal agencies.  Michaels & Monforton, supra note 173, at S44.  OMB’s 
guidelines allow parties to seek correction or retraction of data that doesn’t meet 
its standards.  Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, 
Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 8452, 8459 (Feb. 22, 2002) (“[A]gencies shall establish administrative 
mechanisms allowing affected persons to seek and obtain . . . timely correction 
of information maintained and disseminated by the agency that does not comply 
with OMB or agency guidelines.”). 
 177 Letter from Christopher C. Horner, Senior Fellow, Competitive Enterprise 
Institute, to Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office 
of the President (Feb. 20, 2003), available at http://cei.org/pdf/3360.pdf (petition 
to cease dissemination of the National Assessment on Climate Change pursuant 
to the Data Quality Act). 
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[T]he climate models upon which NACC relies struck out.  
Strike one: they can’t simulate the current climate.  Strike two: 
they falsely predict greater and more rapid warming in the 
atmosphere than at the surface—the opposite is happening.  
Strike three: they predict amplified warming at the poles, which 
are cooling instead.178 
Even the columnist George Will has demonstrated this type of 
“sound science” attack, whether consciously or not, by arguing 
that any contestable assumptions in models make the models 
useless for policy.  In one column Will noted how models 
developed by some scientists in the 1970s predicted a “major 
cooling of the planet” and implied that if these models were wrong 
in the past, current models predicting global warming must also be 
wrong today.179  Will also suggested that if models cannot provide 
definitive, fool-proof answers, they should not be used to help 
formulate policy.180 
In sum, discrediting a model by picking at every instance of 
error or uncertainty offers critics of regulation the easiest path to 
attack policies based on model results when models are 
misunderstood as answer machines.181  It puts upon proponents of 
regulatory intervention the entire burden of persuasion, the entire 
burden of accumulating the available evidence, and the burden of 
drawing credible, defensible inferences from the evidence. It 
simultaneously relieves critics of the burden to develop alternative 
explanations of environmental risk. 
Strategic game playing can also involve technical trickery: 
working backwards from a desired regulatory result, a stakeholder 
can tweak model assumptions and even data sets until they develop 
a favorable model to support their position.182  Stakeholders can 
also cherry-pick models (and modelers) based on the results of the 
model rather than on its reliability for the use in question.183  Using 
rigged models to support value-based positions lends the patina of 
 
 178 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 179 George Will, Op-Ed., Dark Green Doomsayers, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 
2009, at B7. 
 180 See id. 
 181 See supra notes 173–180 and accompanying text. 
 182 MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 45, 60–96 (describing technique in 
broader context of scientific information used for regulation). 
 183 See, e.g., Swinehart, supra note 36, at 1297–98 (describing this 
phenomenon in litigation). 
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scientific credibility to a legal or political argument.184  Moreover, 
when policymakers and legal analysts view models in a 
deterministic way, they are unlikely to be aware of the extent to 
which models can be misused in this way and generally would not 
have the capability to look inside a model to better understand the 
assumptions and related choices that have been made in an effort 
to sort the honest from the dishonest models. 
Another related strategy attempts to influence the 
development of basic modeling practices themselves. For example, 
challenges have been waged against government risk assessments 
that rely primarily on mechanistic animal studies to classify 
substances as known carcinogens.  Challengers insist that in these 
cases epidemiological evidence is essential.185 Such positions 
obviously ignore the statistical challenges of isolating effects in 
human populations and the fact that for many chemicals, there are 
few or no human studies available.186 
In an ideal world, strategic efforts by stakeholders to hijack 
models to suit their interests would be fended off by stakeholders 
of the opposing stripe.  Through adversarial contests at least some 
of the intentional misuse of models by interest groups would 
cancel each other out.  In fact, one study of models suggests that 
this type of balanced participation is actually a prerequisite to the 
effective use of models in policymaking spheres.187 
 
 184 Robert Evans argues that “economic theory and models function as 
legitimizations (and quantifications) of particular political and moral theories 
about the world which can be selectively invoked by policy makers and this 
flexibility, as much as their econometric properties, accounts for the appeal of 
economic models.”  Evans, supra note 124, at 223; see Swinehart, supra note 36, 
at 1298 (observing that “litigation creates incentives for parties to present their 
model as the definitive answer”). 
 185 See, e.g., Tozzi v. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, 271 F.3d 301, 
311–12 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (arguing that HHS’s risk assessments should be based 
primarily on epidemiological studies); see also Siharath v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 
131 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Rider v. Sandoz 
Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that to prevail after 
Daubert, plaintiff must provide “at least some support for the causal hypothesis 
in . . . epidemiological literature, a predictable chemical mechanism, general 
acceptance in learned treatises . . . a plausible animal model, and dozens of well-
documented case reports”); see also Cranor, supra note 120, at 137–38 
(discussing similar case law). 
 186 See NRC, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 
46, at 11 (“Because our [scientific] knowledge is limited, conclusive direct 
evidence of a threat to human health is rare.”). 
 187 See generally King & Kraemer, supra note 7 (describing how models are 
used extensively “as weapons in political and policy warfare,” in which role they 
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Unfortunately, the real world also departs from the idealized 
realm of balanced and diverse participation and is often afflicted 
with very lopsided participation by only one set of interested 
parties.188  Imbalance in participation is one of the primary 
problems the authors identified in the San Joaquin Valley air 
model for example: the authors hypothesize that a more robust and 
expert group of diverse stakeholders would have caught errors in 
the models and held the agency accountable.189  To the extent that 
only one party or stakeholder is on hand, then, the model faces a 
higher likelihood of being hijacked or at least biased heavily 
towards one set of interests. 
In sum, because they are contingent and technically complex, 
and yet at the same time enter a policymaking world that is not 
well prepared to use them wisely, models are fodder for abuse and 
manipulation.  Agencies themselves may misrepresent the 
certainty of a model or obscure controversial assumptions in order 
to ensure that the model survives hostile review from sister 
branches of government or stakeholders.  However, the worst 
abuses in modeling likely arise from private interests that have 
developed sophisticated strategies for undermining the credibility 
of good models and encouraging policymaker reliance on models 
that may be quite biased.190  As long as the policymakers’ 
misunderstanding remains and the modelers fail to correct it, 
 
can play a more constructive part than as neutral “arbiters of truth”). 
 188 See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards 
Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. 
POL. 128, 133–38 (2006) (finding that businesses are the principal non-agency 
participants in notice and comment rulemaking, and that agencies alter their final 
rules to suit the expressed desires of businesses, but not for those of other kinds 
of interests); Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and 
Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (describing how private 
interests benefit by undermining agency accountability and raising participation 
costs for the public when they flood the decision making process with complex 
information).  Moreover, in many environmental and public health settings, there 
are different endowments in expertise and information relevant to participation.  
So, for example, in models of the effects of a substance on health, often the 
manufacturer has far more information than other stakeholders and even the 
agency itself.  In some cases, stakeholders not only benefit in an adversarial way 
from these information advantages, but even conceal the information so that 
others are operating with less complete information.  Asymmetries in the 
relevant information only serve to further tilt the playing field towards some 
participants and away from others. Id. 
 189 See, e.g., Fine & Owen, supra note 24, at 967–69. 
 190 See MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 45, 128–56 (describing tactics 
used to attack research results and discredit and intimidate researchers). 
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models are quite vulnerable to these forms of manipulation. 
III. WHAT TO DO? 
There is an inescapable irony in the state of affairs described 
above: the image of models as “fact generators” has been driven 
by a desire to ensure accountable and rigorous administrative 
governance, yet in the end, the process produces exactly the 
opposite effect.  In this final section we offer suggestions for 
correcting the core misunderstanding as well as redressing the 
subsequent ripple effects that lead to adverse consequences in 
modeling science and regulatory deliberations. 
A. Highlighting the Importance of Models in  
Environmental Regulation 
Before turning to ways that the core misunderstanding and 
resulting adverse consequences might be corrected or at least 
minimized, it is useful to reconsider the benefits of models lest 
some readers be tempted to throw the baby out with the bathwater.  
“If models create this much confusion for policy,” some might 
reason, “perhaps we are better off without them.” 
Models provide several irreplaceable contributions to policy 
that must be retained and reintroduced into environmental 
regulation.  First, models provide a much more rigorous and 
explicit conceptual map about the real world than intuition and 
hunches, which are the next best alternative.  Anchoring the dialog 
in explicit assumptions and model algorithms or other types of 
consistent measurements introduces analytical rigor to decision-
making deliberations that otherwise would be too unwieldy to 
think through, much less debate.191  Models thus play a vital role 
as “a clarifier of issues in debate. . . .  The critics can then question 
why certain variables are included vs. excluded, or why this 
variable is treated exogenously vs. endogenously, or why variables 
are weighted as they are.”192  Models also help track in a rigorous 
way how various policy alternatives might play out in the natural 
 
 191 See Frank A.G. den Butter & Mary S. Morgan, What Makes the Models-
Policy Interaction Successful?, in EMPIRICAL MODELS AND POLICY-MAKING, 
supra note 124, at 279, 295 (“Without the model there is . . . no way that the 
large amount of information on economic developments could be generated, and 
updated, and put together rapidly enough to be used in policy-making.”). 
 192 King & Kraemer, supra note 7, at 7. 
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world.193 
Environmental models can also be integrated across 
disciplines in ways that capitalize on their separate strengths. By 
synthesizing a wide array of information into a single analytical 
tool, models also limit the opportunities for miscommunication 
between specializations.194  In this way, models enforce “a 
discipline of analysis and discourse”195 and of “shared 
understandings” among a wide range of actors.196 
Finally, models help decision-makers evaluate sources of 
uncertainties in the modeling process; sort out the more significant 
causes, contributions, or reforms from the less significant;197 and 
determine the degree to which model results conform to empirical 
data. They provide a useful and effective (but not fool-proof) 
antidote to the dangers of over-determinism and empirical 
relativism.  With regard to the former danger, model evaluation 
reminds a policymaker: “No model is completely right.” And 
regarding the latter, it assures the policymaker, when faced with 
having to choose among (or to synthesize results from) multiple 
models: “Some models are completely wrong.” 
All of these virtues highlight the need to clearly explain the 
limits of models when employing them in policymaking.  Without 
robust descriptions of key assumptions, uncertainties, and even the 
framing of a model, policymakers will not be able to rise above the 
core misunderstandings and make the best use of these important 
regulatory tools. 
 
 193 Cf. Bradley, supra note 134, at 143 (noticing similar benefits of models 
used in economics). 
 194 See Bryan G. Norton, Building Demand Models to Improve Environmental 
Policy Process, in MODEL-BASED REASONING 198, 198 (Lorenzo Magnani & 
Nancy J. Neressian eds., 2002) (describing how creating a shared model to 
answer a social problem or issue can clarify differences among competing 
interests and improve communication and cooperation). 
 195 King & Kraemer, supra note 7, at 8. 
 196 Evans, supra note 124, at 223; see also den Butter & Morgan, supra note 
191, at 307 (noting the “specific kind of interaction” enabled by quantitative 
models “which involves making explicit and integrating the tacit knowledge of 
both groups of participants: modellers and policy makers”). 
 197 See Oreskes et al., supra note 66, at 644 (explaining that models are 
helpful as heuristic tools, representations “useful for guiding further study but 
not susceptible to proof”); Edison & Marquez, supra note 131, at 203 (reporting 
this same virtue in some economic models). 
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B. Correcting the Core Misunderstanding 
Much of the U.S. approach to administrative governance 
appears to rest on the tenuous assumption that rational, 
technocratic analysis, including the false precision in models, can 
guide policy.198  A number of institutional mechanisms, including 
rules for judicial review, have sprouted around this central 
misperception.  Yet to the extent that an “answer machine” 
perspective does capture the prevailing view of policymakers and 
analysts, it is not an easy one to redress. 
Indeed, it seems unlikely that at least in the short-term the 
U.S. will abandon its technocratic approach to rulemaking in favor 
of a more deliberative, flexible decision-making approach.  
Solutions, then, may need to be introduced piecemeal in the hope 
of leveraging them to gradually effectuate a larger shift the 
overarching understanding of models.  For example, if the courts 
alter their rules for judicial review to provide better oversight of 
models, while at the same time appreciating that models cannot 
provide definitive answers, then this can change the agency’s 
incentives as well as the broader legislative and public 
understanding of models.  In addition, it needs to be remembered 
that the relationship between models and policy is not a one-way 
street. Changes to how modelers explain what they do can result in 
changes in what policy-makers and lawyers expect of models.  In 
this section, we propose a series of smaller changes to current 
administrative processes that should correct some of the worst 
problems while also gradually shifting the larger, meta-
characterization of models towards a more realistic and accurate 
understanding of models. 
The first and most important recommendation is to alter 
judicial review rules to reflect a more realistic approach to the 
courts’ oversight of models.  Rather than providing courts with 
judicial discretion to micro-manage agency technical decisions, the 
approach to judicial review we advocate retains the courts as 
enforcers of good modeling processes rather than policing model 
 
 198 See, FISHER, supra note 122, at 28–30; see also, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, 
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 59–68 
(1993) (recommending that an elite group of “super regulators” make regulatory 
decisions rather than basing regulations on public preferences, as is currently the 
case); Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
1059 (2000) (recommending the use of cost-benefit analysis to correct for 
numerous cognitive deficits in public assessment of risk). 
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outputs.  Under our recommended approach, the courts’ primary 
job is to ensure that the models used by regulators comply with 
guidelines for ensuring transparency of the methods and 
assumptions and follow best practices with regard to employing 
multiple models and multiple scenarios.  The courts should also 
oversee the success of the agencies in inviting diverse oversight by 
regulatory participants of the model’s creation and use.199  While 
some of these issues will be technical and contestable, courts in 
general will be resolving disputes about whether a model complied 
with guidelines, rather than deciding whether a model is “good 
science” or “arbitrary” compared to an alternate model propounded 
by a litigant.200 
Our proposed approach resonates with judicial review under 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), but it is 
considerably stronger in large part because the court under our 
proposal must ensure that the model meets relatively specific, 
rigorous requirements identified by modeling scientists.201  Rather 
than a checklist of general features that must be contained in a 
prolix report (as under NEPA), the principles for modeling that we 
envision would include requirements that the model be subjected 
to diverse and rigorous peer review and oversight, evaluation 
mechanisms, explication of uncertainties and policy-relevant 
 
 199 See infra Part III.D. 
 200 For example, Professor Glicksman suggests that courts could play a more 
useful function in judicial review by, for example, insisting that agency’s 
modeling exercises “abide by whatever procedural devices Congress has chosen 
to impose upon them to facilitate transparent decision making,” and that 
agencies: 
reveal the assumptions upon which their models proceeded, as well as 
descriptions of the remaining scientific uncertainties and how they 
affected the agency’s choices.  Finally, the courts should vacate or 
remand agency decisions in which the agency’s explanation fails to 
demonstrate either that the model used is an appropriate one for dealing 
with the particular data gaps the agency is trying to fill, or that a 
relevant model has been misapplied. 
Glicksman, supra note 20, at 526. 
 201 Almost forty years of experience with NEPA reveals that, although its 
analytical requirements may help eliminate some of the very worst projects, 
much of NEPA’s promise of probing policy analysis and agency transparency 
has given way to agencies that now “act as if the detailed statement called for in 
the statute is an end in itself, rather than a tool to enhance and improve decision-
making,” and turn the environmental impact statement into a “litigation-proof” 
document that does not adequately raise or consider alternatives.  COUNCIL ON 
ENVTL. QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A STUDY OF ITS 
EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS at iii (1997). 
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assumptions, and a discussion about how the model was 
extrapolated from its setting to address a larger issue or question.  
This type of specificity is more difficult to establish for the 
extraordinarily diverse range of projects and actions covered under 
NEPA.  Moreover, the added disclosures and assurances of diverse 
oversight of regulatory models will serve to increase the 
opportunity for interested parties to review and challenge the 
model, thus mitigating the need for a high level of judicial scrutiny 
when the model principles are satisfied.  Conversely, when the 
guidelines have not been followed (i.e., a diverse group has not 
been engaged in reviewing the model), then the courts’ role 
becomes more focused. 
Shifting the courts’ focus to best practice guidelines and away 
from the substance of models reflects the suggestions other authors 
have made in the context of the judicial review of models.202  The 
judge would view models with an eye to ensuring that the best 
analytic-deliberative modeling practices have been followed.  If 
one or more best practices have been ignored, the judge would 
expect a reasonable explanation from the agency for the 
divergence.203 
Second, agencies need to develop the capacity to revise and 
evaluate models in a continuous process, rather than incorporating 
models into their decision-making processes in a way that is static 
and cannot be changed.204  This is a more difficult problem to fix 
in administrative law since the current rewards to reviving decided 
policies are low, particularly when regulated parties (typically the 
most powerful stakeholders) will be economically disadvantaged 
by the changes.205  Under the conventional approach to rule 
promulgation, any change in the model—even minor 
adjustments—legally requires the agency to revise the rule, to re-
open notice-and-comment, and ultimately to endure the risk of 
being sued.  The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) thus 
 
 202 See, e.g., Fine & Owen, supra note 24, at 977–79 (citing Sierra Club v. 
Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) for the proposition that courts consider 
public disclosure of assumptions and data in the model; agency acceptance and 
consideration of public comments; and admission of model uncertainties); 
Glicksman, supra note 20, at 526. 
 203 See Doremus & Wagner, supra note 88 (developing this reformed 
approach to judicial review in greater detail). 
 204 NRC, supra note 13, at 161–62. 
 205 Blais & Wagner, supra note 132, at 1712–15 (discussing this problem and 
calling it a “regulatory rut”). 
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discourages model revisions and leads to a very static approach to 
regulatory models.206 
There are several ways that the rulemaking process could 
accommodate the need for model revisions.  The first, suggested 
by the National Research Council, is to build room into the final 
rule promulgation—for example, through a programmatic rule 
allowing for model revisions—so as to leave flexibility for later 
model adjustments, provided they are not significant changes, and 
provided that interested parties have an opportunity to comment on 
them.207  For more significant model adjustments, the agency could 
be statutorily required to review its model periodically (much like 
the Clean Air Act’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards) to 
incorporate changes in information and modeling methods.208  
Since this approach is both costly and time-consuming, it would be 
reserved for only the most significant regulatory models.  
Alternatively, a petition process could be added by Congress that 
allows stakeholders to petition the agency to revise its model when 
significant developments have occurred that lead to material 
differences in how the model works.209  In the end, the best 
approach will likely depend on what model revisions are expected 
in the foreseeable future.  Inevitably, too, there are other ways to 
adjust current, inflexible rulemaking processes to accommodate 
revisions to models as knowledge develops. 
Third, we recommend that agencies and legislatures, where 
possible, be part of the modeling process, and that they ensure that 
the modelers understand the vital interaction required between 
 
 206 Id. at 1705–06. 
 207 NRC, supra note 13, at 167–68. 
 208 See Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2)(A)–(C) (2006) (creating 
an independent scientific review committee, the Clean Air Scientific Advisory 
Committee, charged with reviewing EPA’s ambient air quality standards at five-
year intervals).  A similar form of scientific review is required for EPA’s 
registration of pesticides.  Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act § 
25, 7 U.S.C. § 136w(d)–(e) (2006) (creating the Scientific Advisory Panel to 
review the scientific basis for major regulatory proposals concerning pesticides, 
and to adopt peer-review procedures for scientific studies carried out pursuant to 
the Act). 
 209 See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the 
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1454–55 (1992) (proposing an 
amendment to the APA that would “lower the threshold for initiating rulemaking 
[by the public] and . . . signal [Congress’s] intent that judicial review of agency 
refusals to initiate or to complete existing rulemakings be more stringent in some 
or all circumstances”). 
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science and policy.210  A continuous two-way dialog helps ensure 
that information and assumptions are shared between the two 
groups.  Not only will the policymakers’ intelligent use of models 
improve through this discursive interaction, but there is reason to 
expect that the modelers also will become more attentive to the 
role that values and policy play in their models.  For example, in a 
book examining the use of empirical models for economic 
forecasting and related policies, the editors note that: 
[I]t also seems to be the case that modelers take policy 
problems and questions more seriously when they themselves 
form part of the policy-analysis process and may even have 
some responsibility for explaining policy . . . rather than being 
kept in the back-room, at arm’s length from policy makers and 
those affected by the policy.211 
Maintaining this type of dialogue is perhaps one of our most 
challenging proposals.  As a practical matter, legislatures and 
regulators tend to position themselves as recipients of “facts” 
rather than as co-creators of technical knowledge.  Consequently, 
fact-finding processes may need to be completely revamped to 
create room for two-way discussion between scientists and 
policymakers.  Moreover (and perhaps partly explaining the 
current arrangement), there are risks that too much policymaking 
intervention could lead—either intentionally or unintentionally—
to the manipulation of models to produce desired outcomes.212  
Because of this risk, it is also essential that the next two sets of 
reforms be in place at the same time lest modeling be held captive 
to the whims of government itself. 
C. Reforms in the Science of Modeling 
The scientific community must ultimately achieve some level 
of consensus around a coherent approach to how models should be 
used to draw inferences from uncertain evidence.  Such principles 
 
 210 See den Butter & Morgan, supra note 191, at 307 (emphasizing the 
extremely important nature of this two-way interaction to the intelligent use of 
models for policy). 
 211 Id. at 304–05. 
 212 Cf. Edison & Marquez, supra note 131, at 190–91 (describing three ways 
in which policy makers influence model development through requests for model 
respecification: (1) direct requests for the model to incorporate a certain feature; 
(2) persuasive requests, as when their concerns involve modifying the model; 
and (3) idiosyncratic requests, which are best answered with tailor-made 
models). 
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need to be grounded in an understanding of modeling as an 
analytic-deliberative process, rather than as a predetermined “truth 
machine.”  Specifically, a coherent treatment of evidence in 
models would: (1) describe the assumptions underlying an 
inference, (2) justify why the assumptions apply to the 
circumstances on hand, and (3) explain how the inferences derive 
from the interplay between the assumptions and the evidence.213 
By this definition of coherence, models and their results are 
not innately objective scientific constructs that yield a single, 
verifiable depiction of reality. Rather, even when developed 
according to the best principles of science, models may yield 
multiple versions of reality, each of which may be coherent within 
its own framework of assumptions and each of which may result in 
an alternative set of legal responsibilities.  Moreover, each may lay 
claim to advocates who use administrative and legal procedures to 
contest or support competing viewpoints. 
In light of this, modeling principles should provide, at the 
very least, guidelines on how to expose value-laden choices in 
model framing, in assumptions, and in choices made necessary by 
data uncertainties.214  Additionally, and particularly for 
assumptions and related choices falling in the “values” portion of 
the range, models should be created with a variety of assumptions 
and scenarios that illustrate the differences these assumptions and 
choices make for policymakers.215  The alternate scenarios also 
help educate policymakers to features of the model that prove most 
significant in affecting final outcomes.  In most situations, the 
deployment of multiple models will also help modelers identify 
biases within models and distinguish important areas of 
convergence between different models.216  Simply putting error 
bars around the final result is inadequate in capturing the full 
uncertainties and complexities of models. 
 
 213 To point to one common example of incoherence, it is not coherent when 
assumptions for controlled experiments are used to draw inferences about non-
experimental data drawn from uncontrolled natural phenomena. 
 214 See, e.g., Fine & Owen, supra note 24, at 971–74 (discussing the 
importance of robust “sources of error” discussions in model development 
documentation as a means of holding modelers accountable). 
 215 See generally ROGER A. PIELKE, JR., THE HONEST BROKER: MAKING SENSE 
OF SCIENCE IN POLICY AND POLITICS (2007) (advocating throughout the use of 
scenarios to educate policymakers about scientific insights). 
 216 Farber, supra note 96, at 1691–92 (describing how this technique has been 
deployed to control for uncertainty among climate change models). 
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Ideally, a comprehensive explication of uncertainties, 
assumptions, and model framing would be based on best model 
practices that apply across scientific fields.  Since this seems 
unlikely to occur spontaneously, however, we recommend that 
EPA continue to take the laboring oar—working with scientists—
to develop principles for qualifying and explaining the 
assumptions in models; for exposing alternate scenarios and model 
approaches; and for clarifying whether the inferences made were 
consistent with the assumptions.  Disclosing the provenance of a 
model would also be central to ensuring transparency: if the 
modeler has a conflict of interest, such as creating the model for an 
interested party under contract, then this feature should be 
disclosed along with basic features of the model.217  These best 
practice guidelines need not be “mandates” or requirements for 
models used for policy, but instead best practice codes against 
which modeling exercises are to be evaluated.  EPA has already 
taken a step in the right direction by providing a general set of 
practices for modeling.218  This work should be expanded to 
provide even more detailed guidance. 
When models are developed or used for binding regulation, it 
might be appropriate to go even further than voluntary guidelines 
and actually require accessible descriptions of all significant 
assumptions, sources of uncertainty, and basic model framing.  An 
agency’s failure to provide this type of explication would be 
considered arbitrary and subject the accompanying rule to judicial 
reversal.  Other authors also recommend legal reversal when an 
agency fails to explain the basic uncertainties inherent in a 
model.219 
A number of commentators have suggested that simpler 
models are more amenable to policy-making because they are 
easier to explain.  A presumption might also run in favor of simple 
over complex models for regulation, where possible.220  The NRC 
 
 217 David Michaels & Wendy Wagner, Disclosure in Regulatory Science, 302 
SCI. 2073, 2073 (2003). 
 218 COUNCIL FOR REGULATORY ENVTL. MODELING, EPA, GUIDANCE ON THE 
DEVELOPMENT, EVALUATION, AND APPLICATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODELS 
(2009). 
 219 Fine & Owen, supra note 24, at 972; Glicksman, supra note 20, at 526. 
 220 See den Butter & Morgan, supra note 191, at 294 (noting that if models are 
to play a coordinating and communicative role between different parties, they 
cannot be so complex as to create difficulty in explaining and sharing 
information). 
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report on regulatory models touts the use of simple models for this 
same reason.221 
D. Balanced Participation to Provide a Check on Strategic 
Game Playing 
A final set of challenges arising from the fact-generator vision 
of models occurs when regulatory participants exploit this 
misunderstanding to advance their own ends.  Our main focus here 
is on finding ways to infuse more balance in stakeholder 
participation and engagement with agency models, thus precluding 
some of the worst types of one-sided games.  Without diverse 
stakeholder oversight, the potential for agencies to be hijacked by 
a dominant party or political insider is high. 
If the other reforms are implemented, the opportunities for 
this strategic exploitation should begin to subside, perhaps 
significantly.  For example, greater scientific forthrightness about 
the contingencies of models should make it easier for a broad 
range of stakeholders to participate in overseeing models used for 
policy.  This scientific forthrightness will also enable stakeholders 
to more readily judge whether they have a stake in the issue (for 
example, critical assumptions run against their core value choices 
or, conversely, critical assumptions are all congenial to their 
interests and thus enhance their support for the model).  Accessible 
and transparent explications of uncertainties, inferences, and 
assumptions help lower at least some costs of public participation 
and engagement which, in turn, enables a greater number of those 
interested and attentive to a model and its attendant policy to 
engage in the regulatory process. 
Still, greater forthrightness about model qualities is unlikely 
to be sufficient, and in some settings could even backfire to the 
extent these qualifications add to the complexity of the models.  To 
better balance the groups overseeing models, there are several 
preliminary steps that could be taken.  First, and perhaps 
particularly when stakeholder participation is noticeably skewed, 
agencies should be encouraged or even required to use science 
advisory groups to scrutinize their models.222  These science 
 
 221 NRC, supra note 13, at 10–11 (recommending parsimony in model 
selection, development, and use). 
 222 See Glicksman, supra note 20, at 522–23 (arguing that, because 
solicitation of input from all interested members of the public “is essential to the 
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advisory groups would not only assess the agency’s use of models 
and alternate scenarios, including the analytical frameworks for the 
models as well as the assumptions, but would also consider how 
well the agency used a model for a particular application.223  We 
hasten to add that the use of advisory groups is much more helpful 
than simply ensuring that a model has been “peer reviewed” or 
published in the peer reviewed literature.  As Swinehart notes, 
simpler forms of peer review are likely to miss most of the 
important facets and contributions that models make (or don’t 
make, as the case may be) to policymaking.224 
Second, unrepresented sets of stakeholders might be 
subsidized to better enable them to participate in the oversight of 
regulatory models.  This could be accomplished in part by 
ensuring that the agency’s discussions of model assumptions and 
uncertainties are readily accessible to less expert participants.225  
For instance, the software package Analytica provides an effective 
way to represent nearly all facets of a complex model, starting with 
the framing of the problem.226  One adjustment, then, would be to 
add to the best practices devised by scientists or EPA supplemental 
best practices that make model choices accessible to stakeholders 
with limited technical knowledge. 
Finally, agencies could be encouraged to ensure this balanced 
participation indirectly through revised judicial review rules.  For 
example, courts could provide “super” deference when the record 
reveals a diverse group of vigorous stakeholders engaged in 
oversight of a model used to support a rule.227  Conversely, if only 
 
making of informed judgments on . . . extra-scientific questions,” agencies must 
explain its use of models in terms accessible to non-experts). 
 223 Swinehart also suggests this type of focus for evaluating models, although 
his recommendation is targeted to the courts’ oversight of models in judging the 
reliability of scientific testimony in private tort litigation.  Swinehart, supra note 
36, at 1319 (arguing that judges should always consider whether “the model 
[was] applied correctly within its practical boundaries and theoretical limits”). 
 224 Id. at 1306–07 (describing at least three ways peer review can be a 
misleading criterion for determining model reliability in policy settings). 
 225 Fine & Owen, supra note 24, at 975–76. 
 226 Analytica is a software package for creating, analyzing, and 
communicating decision models designed around user-friendly interfaces and 
marketed to consumers with a range of computer proficiencies.  What is 
Analytica?, http://www.lumina.com/ana/whatisanalytica.htm (last visited Mar. 
10, 2010). 
 227 See generally Wagner, supra note 188 (describing this proposal in greater 
detail). 
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one set of stakeholders is present through much of the rulemaking 
and the agency makes no effort to ensure balanced participation 
from a mix of stakeholders in its modeling effort, the agency’s rule 
would receive a hard look if challenged by an underrepresented 
party.228  Although there are some reasons why this might not 
work as planned, such a review standard might help create a 
responsibility by the agency to ensure their models are vetted by 
the full range of interested parties. 
CONCLUSION 
By isolating the core misunderstanding of models used for 
policy and tracing the ripples out from this misunderstanding in the 
development and use of models for regulation, we have isolated 
some regulatory problems that deserve attention.  Because models 
provide rich sources of valuable information, it is in policymakers’ 
interest to take a leadership role to correct their common 
misunderstanding.  We hope that very soon agencies, 
policymakers, and legal analysts will take the lead and use models 
more productively in the future. 
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